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Behavioural Contexts for the Expression PfModern Racism: The Simulated Juror
Paradigm

Abstract
The central tenet of modem racism theory is that, although overt prejudice seems to
have declined, subtle forms of prejudice are still pervasive. The theory predicts that
members of a majority racial group will discriminate against members of a minority
racial group only when they feel that they can do so without appearing to be

prejudiced. Thus, the occurrence of discrimination depends upon the nature of the
behavioural context. The purpose of the present study was to explore the
implications of modern racism theory in the behavioural domain by employing the
simulated juror paradigm. The participants, 338 randomly selected residents of the
city of Perth, read one of six versions of a hypothetical criminal case (burglary)
varying the race of the defendant (Aboriginal or Caucasian) and type of jury

instructions (none, "evidence" instructions, or "non-prejudice" instructions) and then
made individual judgments about the defendant's guilt. The 2 X 3 design was
analysed using log-linear (guilty/not guilty as a dichotomous dependant variable)

and ANOVA (continuous measures of confidence in guilt judgment and personal
opinion of guilt as dependant variables) analytical procedures. Analysis was also
carried out on qualit•tive data ("why did you judge the defendant to be guilty I not
guilty?"). The results indicated that race of the defendant and type of instructions
had no effect on the judgments made by participants. The discussion raises the issue

of variability in the salience of race and the social desirability for egalitarianism
across social contexts, and explores possible limitations of modem racism theory as
it is presently defined.
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Introduction
A number of authors in the United States have reported that there has been a
steady decline in the belief in familiar negative stereotypes for hlacks (Dovidio &
Gaertner, 1986; Katz, Wackenhut, & Huss, 1986; Kinder & Scars, 1981;
McConahay & Hough, 1976). Although this could be seen to indicate a quantitative

change in the degree of racism, these authors have attributed this to a qualitative
change in the nature of racism. Katz, et al. have referred to a "fundamental duality"
in attitudes to blacks, an inconsistency between an overwhelming endorsement of
egalitarian principles on the one hand, and a general lack of support for concrete
applications such as racial quotas in hiring on the other hand. The general
conclusion has been that, although overt prejudice seems to have declined, subtle
forms of prejudice are still pervasive (Wolfe & Spencer, 1996) and "reach into even
the most fundamental social institutions" (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986, p.27). Such

inconsistencies shown toward blacks are said to reflect a new, more complex, form
of prejudice variously called symbolic racism (Kinder & Sears), modern racism
(McConahay), ambivalent racism (Katz, et a!.), and aversive racism (Gaertner &

Dovidio). Researchers in Australia have reached similar conclusions regarding
attitudes toward Australian Aborigines (see Pederson & Walker, 1997).

Modern Racism
McConahay and Hough (1976) reported their most concise definition of

symbolic racism (McConahay later preferred the term "modem racism", see, e.g.,
McConahay, 1983) as: "the expression in terms of abstract ideological symhols and
symbolic behaviours of the feeling that blacks are violating cherished values and
making illegitimate demands for changes in the racial status quo." Essentially,
McConahay and Hough proposed that the modern racist does not believe that blacks
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are biologically inferior, but docs believe that blacks violate values associated with
what McConahay and Hough call "American civil Protestantism" -a value system
derived from the secularised versions of the Protestant work ethic. Individuals who
hold such a value system believe in hard work, individualism, and delay of
gratification (McConahay & Hough, 1976). McConahay and Hough suggested that

modem racists express their anti-black prejudice by claiming that blacks are
demanding too much in tenns of affirmative action policies, and that they arc not
prepared to work to improve their social status. Thus, the perceived behaviour of
blacks violates the whites' values of hard work, individualism (that is, blacks are not
self-sufficient), and delay of gratification (blacks are not prepared to work toward

long tenn goals). A theory of racism which is based upon values is not an entirely
novel concept: Biernat, Vescio, Theno, and Crandall (1996) noted that this aspect of

modern racism is consistent with Rokeach's theory of belief congruence, which
suggests that prejudice is based upon the assumption that members of outgroups
(i.e., minority groups) hold beliefs (attitudes and values) that differ from one's own.
The view of Katz et a!. (1986) of this new form of racism emphasises the

existence of two, distinct, value-attitude structures existing simultaneously within
individuals: one, the Protestant work ethic, and the other, a humanitarian-egalitarian
ideal. Katz and Hass (1988) found an association between egalitarian values and pro-

black attitudes, and also found an association between Protestant work ethic values and
anti-black attitudes. Katz and Hass suggested that these two value orientations
contribute to the expression of prejudice in either a facilitating (Protestant work ethic)
or inhibiting (humanitarian-egalitarian) manner. This notion of two, incongruous, value
systems operating within individuals led Katz and Hass to refer to this subtle variant of

racism as "runM:~alent racism."
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Gaertner and Dovidio ( 1986) also consider this new fonn of racism to he
1

ambivalent in that it includes the simultaneous existence (within an individual) of
both positive and negative feelings (the "fundamental duality" referred to by Katz, ct
al., 1986) towards blacks. Gaertner and Dovidio have suggested that this new fonn
of racism is expressed by those with strong egalitarian values2 , and that the
ambivalence stems from a conflict between, on the one hand, feelings and beliefs
associated with an egalitarian value system and, on the other hand, unacknowledged
negative feelings and beliefs concerning blacks. Gaertner and Dovidio proposed
that, because these people are concerned about maintaining a non-prejudiced self
image, the negative component is often manifested in subtle and rationalisable ways.
That is, a modern racist will use non-racial factors to justify a behaviour that is
biased against blacks. For example, an employment officer might decline to hire a
black job applicant (for unstated racial reasons) and justifY the decision by claiming
that the black applicant is under-qualified - because to justifY his/her behaviour
along racial lines (i.e., "because he is black") would be sochlly unacceptable (and/or
incongruent with the employment officer's self concept as an egalitarian person).
Naturally, in order for the employment officer to be able to discriminate against a
black person and not be liable for accusations of prejudice or racism, the context
must be such that the criteria used for not hiring the black person is not directly
comparable to criteria that has been used to hire a white person (McConahay, 1983).
For example, if an employment officer was to evaluate a black applicant ofter

1

Note that Katz, et al, ( 1986) labeled this new form of racism "ambivalent" racism, while Gaertner
and Dovidio (1986) referred to it as "aversive" racism. In spite of the different labels, all these
authors (including McConahay, 1986) have emphasised the ambivalent nature of the new form of
racism. For the purposes of this discussion, the new form of racism will be referred to as "modem
racism". Where relevant the subtle distinctions between the different perspectives will be highlighted.
2
Note that it is generally presumed that the endorsement of egalitarian values is the current social
norm, and that even those who do not hold strong egalitarian values wili tend to be strongly
motivated by social desirability factors to display egalitarian values to others (see Dovidio &

Gaertner, 1986).
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responding favourably to a similarly or less qualified white applicant, they would
not (according to modern racism theory) be expected to discriminate against the
black applicant (McConahay).
Like Gaertner and Dovidio (1986), McConahay (1986) has also proposed
that the attitudes of whites toward blacks include anti-black feelings/affect. In a
survey of a general population, McConahay and Hough (1976) found that
participants expressed moral outrage at what blacks were doing and demanding as a
group. Content analyses and multiple regression analyses perfonned on the survey
data indicated that an important root for the anger expressed toward blacks was
negative feelings (McConahay & Hough). McConahay proposed that, although
expressed racist attitudes have dt:clined, there has only been a modest decline in
these negative feelings toward blacks. Studies on racism socialisation (see
McConahay & Hough) have indicated that the affective component of racist
attitudes is acquired early, is predominately nonverbal, and is very resistant to
change by later experiences. Thus, values which develop later in an individual's
social maturation process - such as egalitarian values - develop after anti-black
feelings, and are not necessarily able to over-ride the earlier developed, resistant,
negative feelings. McConahay, also proposed that these lingering negative feelings
influence the cognitive and conative components of whites' racist attitudes when
they (i.e. whites) are called upon to engage in such activities as voting, giving
opinions to survey interviewers, serving on juries, or interacting with blacks on a
day-to-day basis (McConahay).
In summary, the modern racism perspective has developed from the general
perception that there has been a reduction in overt prejudice, but not subtle
prejudice. The modern racist attitude is said to stem from two, discrete, value
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orientations in contemporary American society, the Protestant work ethic and a
humanitarian-egalitarian ideal. The Protestant work ethic has an emphasis on selfreliance and self-discipline, while the humanitarian-egalitarian value has an
emphasis on equality. As a result of these two conflicting value systems, individuals
are motivated to be (or appear to be) non-prejudiced, but arc nevertheless influenced
by anti-black feelings associated with the Protestant work ethic. Although modern
racism theory has had its critics (see Wood, 1994, for a summary of the relevant
issues) it has had a major influence on the perspectives taken by researchers of
racism- and prejudice in general- since the early 1970's.

Empirical Evidence for Modern Racism Effects
Given that a fundamental tenet of modem racism theory is that individuals
are influenced by conflicting value systems to have both positive and negative
attitudes toward blacks, the question is "which attitude is likely to dominate?'
Furthermore, although McConahay (1986) has consistently found evidence of
negative attitudes toward blacks, it cannot be assumed that negative attitudes will
necessarily lead to discriminatory behaviours (see Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977, for a
discussion on the distinction between attitudes3 and behaviours). Thus, a critical
issue in the application of the theory of modem racism is the behavioural contexts in
which racist effects might be expected to be found. A number of studies have been
conducted to examine the potential for racial discrimination in behaviours such as
job applicant selection, helping behaviours, and the administration of punishment in

3

This distinction is further complicated by the confusing use of the word "attitudes"; at times it is
used to refer to beliefs about an attitude object, and at other times it is used to refer to discriminatory
behaviours shown toward an attitude object. Indeed, the tripartite model of attitudes suggests that
attitudes include three components: beliefs, behaviours- and affect (Breckler, 1984). For the
purposes of this discussion, the term "discrimination" will be used to refer to behaviours and the term
"attitudes" will be used to refer to beliefs. When referring to the expressed ideas of other authors and
it is unclear whether they are referring to an attitude or a behaviour, their original terminology will be
retained.
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learning situations (essentially these were laboratory studies on aggression) (Crosby,
Bromley & Saxe, 1980).

In a study which examined the potential for racial discrimination in joh
applicant selection, McConahay (1983) found that participants were more likely to
select a white candidate over a black candidate, but demonstrated a reverse
discrimination (i.e., rated black candidates higher than white candidates) when
norms for behaviour Wf~re established. McConahay's procedure of establishing
norms for behaviour was to have a participant rate a white applicant (a photograph
of the job candidate was included in the job application viewed by participants)
before rating a black job applicant with similar qualifications. McConahay

concluded that once nonns for behaviour were established (i.e., once a participant
had rated a white job applicant), participants were unable to discriminate against
blacks without appearing to be prejudiced and that the reverse discrimination was

the result of participants overcompensating in an effort to ensure that they did not
appear to be prejudiced. As a result of this finding, McConahay proposed a general

tenet of modern racism: that one might only expect racial discrimination to occur
when norms for behaviour have not been established.
Another context for the behavioural expression of modern racism that
researchers have explored is the area of helping behaviours (Gaertner & Dovidio,
1986). In these studies, participants are typically presented with the opportunity to
aid another individual (often a confederate of the experimenter) who is either black
or white. The dependent variable is the differential amount of aid given to whites

and blacks. It is concluded that discrimination exists when individuals from one
group (e.g., whites) receive significantly more help than individuals from the other
group (e.g., blacks). From the analysis of a series of such studies, Gaertner and
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Dovidio concluded that white participants were more likely to help whites than
blacks- but only when the experimental situation was such that participants felt that
they could do so without appearing to be prejudiced. For example, Gaertner and
Dovidio ( 1977) found that when a subject was alerted to the need for help by either a

black or white confederate (of the experimenter) and the subject was aware of the
presence of other bystanders, the subject was much less likely to help a black victim
than a white victim. Thus, the subject is able to claim that he/she did not help the

black victim - not because the victim was black, but because the subject assumed
somebody else was going to help. In this instance, the opportunity to diffuse

responsibility for intervening could be used by the paiticit::ant as a nonracial factor
to justify his/her racist behaviour and allow the participant to maintain a nonprejudiced image.
Another study by Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) found that more help was

gtven to a black confederate than to a white confederate when a request for
assistance was issued by a disinterested (white) third party rather than by the
potential recipient. They concluded that a request for help from a third party
influences a participant's normative beliefs about the appropriateness of helping.
That is, when a third party issues the request, the participant believes that the
socially acceptable thing to do is to give assistance. If the participant does not give
assistance (when the person in need of help is black), he/she could be perceived as

being racist. Once again, Gaertner and Dovidio concluded that the critical
determinant for the participant's helping behaviour was the threat to the participant's
non-prejudiced self image, and that when this self image is threatened, participants

overcompensate in an effort to appear non-prejudiced.
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This conclusion by Dovidio and Gaertner (1986) was supported by findings
of Katz, ct al. (1986). Katz ct al. found that when participants were asked if they
would give some assistance to a confederate (either black or white) of the
experimenter, they gave significantly more assistance to a white confederate than to
a black confederate. However, when, in the same study, participants were led to
believe that they had upset the confederate, Katz, et al. found that partir:ipants gave
significantly more assistance to a black confederate than to a white confederate.
Like McConahay, Katz et al. concluded that the reverse discrimination was a result
of participants overcompensating in an effort to appear non-prejudiced.
The subtle nature of modem racism (it is often described as a subtle form of

racism when contrasted with overt, or old fashioned, prejudice, see, e.g., Dovidio &
Gaertner, 1986) was demonstrated in a series of studies on aggression by
Donnerstein & Donnerstein (1973; Donnerstien, Donnerstein, Simon & Ditrichs,
!972). These studies followed the same general procedure. The participant, who was
led to believe that he/she was participating in an experiment on learning, was
assigned to the role of teacher while a confederate of the experimenter was assigned
to the role of learner. The participant's task was to administer an electrical shock
(unbeknown to the participant, no actual shock was delivered to the confederate) to
the learner each time the learner made a mistake on the learning task. The
participant was free to select the level of the intensity of the shock (represented by a
d;al on the "shock machine") and the duration of the shock (the amount of time the
participant depressed the "shock button"). The independent variables (other than
race) in these studies were retaliation (the participant was led to believe that he/she
would be exchanging roles with the confederate, Donnerstein, Donnerstein, Simon,

& Ditrichs, 1972), censure (the participant was led to believe that his/her responses
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would br recorded, Donncrstein & Donncrstcin, 1973), and rmonymity (the
participant was led to believe that hisfhcr responses would be anonymous,
Donnerstein & Donncrstein; Donncrstein, ct a!.).
The interaction effects in these studies revealed subtle discriminatory
behaviours against blacks. In the retaliation condition (i.e., when the participants
believed that they would be exchanging places with the learner), the participants

tended to give shocks of lower intensity but longer duration to the learner- but only
when the learner was black (Donnerstcin et al., 1972). A similar pattern of results

was found in the censure condition, (Donnerstein & Donnerstein, 1973). No such
effects were found when the learner was white. It was suggested that this

demonstrated a subtle negative response to the black confederate (Donnerstein et at.,
1972). That is, the intensity of the shock (shown on the dial) was explicit - both to
the participant and to any observer- but the duration of the shock was not explicit

and may even have been outside of the participant's awareness. The overa11
conclusion was that aggression against blacks (by whites) tends to occur when there
is little chance of being noticed, that is, when there is little chance of being

perceived as being prejudiced (Donnerstein & Donnerstein; Donnerstein, et al.).
The general conclusion from the above studies was that individuals are
highly motivated to appear non-prejudiced, and that they are therefore only likely to
discriminate against blacks when there are non-racial factors available to justifY
their behaviour and when norms for behaviour (for the specific behavioural context)
have not been established (McConahay, 1986).

The ambivalent nature ofmodern racism.

An aspect of modem racism theory demonstrated in the above studies is the
phenomenon of extreme responses (i.e., either an anti-black bias - or a pro-black
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bias) to racial situations depending upon the context of the interpersonal interaction.
For example, McConahay (1986) did not find that biases disappeared when norms

for behaviour were established - but found that participants demonstrated a bias
toward the favouritism of blacks. ln the study on helping behaviours by Gaertner
and Dovidio (1986) cited above- in which participants who were aware of the
presence of other bystanders helped black victims much Jess than they helped white

victims- participants who thought that they were the only witness of the victim's
plight, helped black victims more often than they helped white victims. As noted
above, the opportunity to diffuse responsibility for intervening could be used by the

participant as a nonracial factor to justify his/her racist behaviour. Thus, the
detennining factor for whether pro-black or anti-black discrimination would occur in
these two studies is the availability (to the participant) of non-racial factors which
can be used to justify discriminatory behaviours against blacks. If non-racial factors

are available, the participants either do not perceive that their behaviours are
prejudiced- or believe that their behaviours will not be perceived by others as being
prejudiced. If non-racial factors are not available (because, e.g., norms for behaviour
have been clearly established) participants discriminate in favour of blacks as a
result of overcompensating in an effort to appear non-prejudiced (Gaertner &
Dovidio; McConahay). These polarised responses are considered to be a result of the
proposed ambivalent nature of modem racism (Katz et a!, !986; Gaertner &
Dovidio; McConahay). As noted above, the term ambivalent (in modern racism
theory) refers to the fact that whilst a modem racist's attitudes and behaviours can
be determined by anti-black feelings (associated with values based upon the
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Protestant work ethic)- they can also be moderated by strong egalitarian values. 4

The findings from these studies Jed McConahay ( 1986) to conclude that the
specific contexts necessary for the expression of negative racial attitudes and
behaviours arc those contexts which allow for a plausible, nonprcjudiccd
explanation for what might be considered prejudiced behaviour. Conversely,
positive or overly positive behaviour, McConahay concluded, is likely to be
exhibited under conditions which maximise the likelihood that a negative behaviour

will bring a self- or other - generated attribution of prejudice. That is, situations
low in ambiguity, where the nonns are clear, social comparisons are possible,
responsibility cannot be diffused, race is salient, or where nonracial attributions are

not readily available (McConahay). (Although McConahay was not explicit on this
point, it should be noted that these conditions are not mutually exclusive. For
example, social comparisons can clarify norms and reduce the ambiguity of the

situation- thereby removing the availability of nonracial attributions.)

Generalisability of the Theory ofModern Racism: The Australian Context
Modem racism theory, as outlined above, is based upon the work of
researchers who have focused upon the relationship between the dominant white and

the minority black (African American) social groups in the United States. How
generalisable are the tenets of this theory, then, to other racial/national contexts? Is

modem racism a phenomenon peculiar to the United States?
From a series of experiments in intergroup discrimination, Tajfel (1970,
4

It should be noted that Katz et al. (1936) believed that the egalitarian values are associated with
legitimate positive feelings and sympathy for blacks, while McConahay (1986) and Gaertner and
Dovidio (1986) believed that some individuals are motivated by strongly held egaliatarian values to
appear non-prejudiced to themselves, and other individuals are motivated to appear to be nonprejudiced to others because of social desirability factors. For the purposes of the present discussion,
the position taken by the author is that it is reasonable to assume that in!.lividual variation exists: that
is, a few individuals have legitimate positive feelings and sympathy for blacks, a few people are
concerned only with appearing non-prejudiced to others, but the majority of individuals arc motivated
to appear non-prejudiced both to themselves and to others.
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p.96) concluded that "altitudes of prejudice toward outgroups and the hehaviour

or

discrimination against outgroups clearly display a set of common characteristics."

Tajfel's conclusion suggests that modem racism theory would provide a legitimate
perspective for the study of racial prejudice and discrimination in contexts other than
the United States - and, indeed, researchers in both Europe and South Africa have
taken this position. Stuart ( 1993), for example, identified modem racism as the basis
for racial discrimination in Britain. Pettigrew and Meertens ( 1995), from the data

gathered from 3,810 European respondents across four nations, found evidence for
the cross-national importance of the distinction between blatant and subtle prejudice.
In South Africa, Duckitt (1991) noted that the overt expression or endorsement of
openly racist sentiments had become less socially acceptable and suggested that the
theory of modem racism was applicable to the study of racial attitudes of white
South Africans toward black South Africans. Indeed, it has also been suggested that

many of the premises of modem racism can be used to understand prejudices shown
toward a variety of minority groups- such as women (Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter,
1995), homosexuals and fat people (Biernat, Vescio, Theno, & Crandall, 1996).

In Australia, too, researchers have recognised that the modem racism
perspective provides an appropriate theoretical framework for understanding racial
discrimination shown toward Australian Aborigines by the dominant white, AngloSaxon, population (Augoustinos, Ahrens, & Innes, 1994; Locke, MacLeod, &
Walker, 1994; Pedersen, Contos, Bishop, & Walker, 1997; Pedersen & Walker,
1997; Walker, I994). There are, of course, fundamental differences between the
social histories of Australian Aborigines and African Americans and their

relationships with their respective dominant white cultures. For instance, African
Americans were taken to the Americas as slaves, while Aborigines are the

•
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indigenous population of Australia. Also, since Aborigines arc few in absolute
numbers (about 21X, of the total popuhttion) and arc lurgcly unemployed, they do not

provide the economic competition that African Americans (about 10'% of the total
population) do in the United Stutes (Ray, 1981). Nevertheless, us with African

Americans in the United Sillies, attitudes shown towards Aborigines by the
dominant white culture appear to be the most perennial and political racial issue in
Australia (Ray) - and there is considerable evidence to suggest that attitudes toward

Australian Aborigines fits the modern racism paradigm of the United States.
As in the United States, researchers in Australia have noted a decline in the
expression of overt prejudices toward Aborigines (Beswick & Hills, I 972; Pedersen

& Walker, 1997), but not in the expression of subtle prejudices (Pedersen et al.,
!997; Pedersen & Walker). Pedersen and Walker concluded that it has become
increasingly more socially unacceptable to express explicitly negative attitudes

about Australian Aborigines. This conclusion is in line with conclusions drawn by
modem racism theorists in the United States with respect to the attitudes of white
Americans toward African Americans (see, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, I 986), and is
an indication that, as in the United States, a belief in an egalitarian ideal is the

prevailing nonn in contemporary Australian society.
As noted above, one of the fundamental aspects of modem racism noted by

North American researchers is the existence of two distinct value-attitude structures
existing simultaneously within individuals: a belief in an egalitarian ideal - and a
belief in the Protestant work ethic (see, e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986). Evidence
for the existence of these two value-attitude structures (with respect to Aborigines)
has been found by Australian researchers. For example, it has been found that white
Australians believe that Aborigines are asking for too much in terms of financial
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assistance from the government (Augoustinos, ct al., 1994). That is, white
Australians believe thut Aborigines arc not prepared to work in order to take
responsibility for improving their socio-economic status. (As noted ahovc,
individuals who believe in the Protestant work ethic believe in hard work,
individualism, and delay of gratification, McConahay & Hough, 1976).

Larsen

(1981, p.ll7), commenting on the data he had gathered in a survey of a community's
(the town of Townsville, Queensland) attitudes toward Aborigines, noted that
"nearly all of the comments listed referred to perceived [italics added] Aboriginal

refusal to confonn to white community standards of behaviour." Even more
poignantly, from the results of a study on stereotypes of Aborigines, Marjoribanks
and Jordan (1986) concluded that many unfavourable attitudes toward Aborigines

stem from the perception of white Australians that Aborigines do not embrace white
values about work, thrift and self-reliance. These studies offer compelling evidence
to support the proposition that negative attitudes toward Australian Aborigines are
associated with values which stem from the Protestant work ethic.
In summary, studies which have examined the namre of whites' attitudes
toward Aborigines in Australia have indicated that there is a striking similarity
between a number of aspects of the attitudes expressed about Australian Aborigines
and the attitudes expressed about African Americans - aspects which have been
identified by North American researchers as the defining characteristics of modem

racism. Thus, it is not surprising that a number of Australian researchers have
concluded (as have European and South African researchers) that modem racism is
not a phenomenon peculiar to the United States.
It is important to note that the vast majority of racism research in Australia to

date has focused upon the measurement of attitudes (Beswick & Hills, !969, !972;
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Larsen, 1978; Ray, 1981; Walker, 191J4), the nature of stereotypes (Augoustinos,

c:.:t

ul. 1994; Locke ct al., 1994; Murjoribanks & Jordan, 1986) or the identification of

associated construcls (e.g., individualism-collectivism, authoritarianism, group
relative deprivation, sec Larsen, 1981; Pedersen & Walker, 1997) rather than upon

the nature and extent of discriminatory behaviours. As shown by the modem racism
studies reported above, varying situational contexts can lead to variation in the
discriminatory behaviour shown towards members of a minority racial group within

an individual. This has obvious implications for the limitations of predictions of
discriminatory behaviours that are made from measures cf attitudes which give only
a single, generalised altitude toward Aborigines. As noted by Duckitt (1992), the

available evidence suggests that discriminatory intergroup behavior is co-determined
by both prejudice (i.e., attitude) and situational factors. It is therefore apparent that
there needs to be further research (using experimental designs) on the specific

contexts in which discriminatory behaviours toward Australian Aboriginals occur.

The Juror Task: A Behavioural Context For the Expression of Modern Racism?
The findings of discriminatory behaviours in favour of blacks discussed
above (e.g., Katz et al., 1986; Gaertner and Dovidio, 1977; Gaertner & Dovidio,
1986; McConahay, 1983) led Gaertner and Dovidio (1986, p. 85) to conclude that

"techniques directed at revealing the negative components of aversive [see
footnote'] racists' attitudes would probably only produce reverse discrimination or a
token reaction that would permit aversive racists to deny their anti-black feelings."
The implication of this conclusion by Gaertner and Dovidio is that techniques (i.e.,
techniques designed to alert an individual to the potential prejudicial nature of their
responses) which are derived from the principles of the theory of modem racism
may not effectively eliminate bias, but rather, may produce unreliable behavioural

Modem Racism I (J

effects. Indeed, the findings of the studies cited ahove would lead one to expect that
the utilisation of such techniques might well result in discriminatory behaviours in
favour of blacks. This assertion by Gaertner and Dovidio has obvious implications
for the dec·t::»ion making task of jurors - a behavioural context nominated by
McConahay ( 1986) as being susceptible to the effects of modem racism. For

instance: Are jurors able to put aside any generic prejudices they might have and
make a judgment based solely on the evidence presented in court? If jurors do make
a commitment to putting aside their generic prejudices, will they overcompensate
and discriminate in favour ofblack defendants?
Wrightsman (1987) noted that the courts make implicit assumptions about

the psychological nature and behaviour of jurors, that is, that jurors can respond in a
way that is free from bias. This assumption has been questioned by researchers in
psychology. Nickerson, Mayo, and Smith (1986), for example, suggested that racist
attitudes can affect judicial decisions blatantly, or more likely, in the subtle ways
suggested by modem racism theory. The theory of modem racism predicts that, in

cases where the evidence is balanced (in the sense that any potential juror is as likely
to convict as to acquit when no confounding variables such as race are included),
white jurors will be free to make biased judgments against blacks because they can

point to the evidence to justify their decision. That is, they can point to non-racial
factors to justify a behaviour that is biased against blacks. For example, take the

hypothetical case where a group of mock jurors are presented with a trial summary
with balanced evidence and the majority of the mock jurors judge a black defendant
guilty. Any one of the majority of jurors who judge the black defendant guilty can
quite legitimately defend their judgment by claiming that the evidence is strong
enough to convict any defendant - regardless of race. Thus, the egalitarian self-
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concept (or cgalitari;:m public irmrgc) of such a JUror would not be directly
threatened.
Although from an examination of modern racism theory one would expect
the decision-making task or jurors to be susceptible to racial biases, Duckitt ( 1992),
in a discussion which explored the situational determinants of discrimination,
implied that this might not be the case. From a review of a range of studies looking
at discrimination, Duckitt (p. 297) concluded that discrimination tends to occur in
situations which involve informal social interaction - and tends not to occur in
situations which involve "structured tasks with relatively clear-cut goals and
procedures" and have an expectation of "equity, objectivity, and fairness." This
appears to be a fairly accurate description of the decision-making task of jurors.
However, in his review, Duckitt does not include any of the simulated juror studiesmany of which have found effects of racial discrimination (Mazzella & Feingold,
1994).

The simulated juror task.
The simulated juror task is a research paradigm in which participants are

presented with a trial summary with balanced evidence as defined above (see
Mazzella & Feingold, 1994, for an extensive analysis of over 80 such studies).

From the findings of a meta-analysis of 41 simulated juror studies on race, Mazzella
and Feingold concluded that, depending on the circumstances (the specific nature of
which it is difficult to discern due to the inevitable varying methodologies of the

various studies), the judgments of mock jurors are sometimes biased in favour of
blacks, and at other times are biased against blacks. This conclusion of Mazzella and
Feingold seems to lend some support for the proposed ambivalent nature of modem
racism (McConahay, 1986; Katz, et al, 1986; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).
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The mdlif.~1 ing effect.~ ofjwy instructions.

One study which used the simulated juror task to examine discriminatory
behaviour from a modem racism perspective presented participants with a trial
summary in which the defendant was chan!ed with rape (Pfeifer & Ogloff, I991 ).
Pfeifer and Ogloff found an effect for race (i.e., a black defendant was more likely to
be found guilty than a white defendant) but found that when they included jury

instructions which specified the need to be free from "sympathy or prejudice" and
the conditions required to find a defendant guilty, black defendants were no longer
more likely to be found guilty than white defendants. Pfeifer and Ogloff{p. 1713)

concluded that jury instructions might "serve to dissipate juror's overt prejudices."
With reference to modem racism theory, Pfeifer and Ogioff (p.1715) referred to

Dovidio and Gaertner's suggestion that the apparent decline in overt prejudice may
be the result of a change to a more subtle form of racism that does not directly

challenge abstract principles of egalitarianism. That is, in the current social climate,
racial biases are only likely to occur when race is not perceived to be an issue. Thus,
jury instructions might alert the juror to the fact that racial prejudice might be an

issue, and thus cause them to adjust their judgement accordingly.

Implications of the nature of the crime in jury studies.
For the purposes of testing the general predictions of modem racism theory
in a simulated juror task, the crime of rape might not be the most appropriate (in
terms of ease of interpretation and genera!isabilty) crime to use. In a study which

examined the data from the prospective jurors for 25 Canadian criminal trials
involving charges of sexual abuse (849 prospective jurors in total), Vidmar (1997)
found that, on average, 36% of the jurors (who were told only the nature of the
charges against the accused) stated that they could not decide the case with a fair
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and impurtial mind. It appears thi.lt cnmcs which involve sexual assault elicit
particularly high levels of emotional response, such that, in many cases, jurors
believe that they arc unable to set aside their prejudices and maintain a presumption
of innocence. Vidmar concluded that, in trials which involve charges of sexual
assault, the judgements of jurors arc more susceptible to the generic prejudices of
jurors. Thus a crime which avoids the confounds elicited by a sexual assault- such
as the crime of burglary (without physical assault or confrontation)- might provide

a more useful (i.e., more generalisable) test for the predictions of modem racism
theory.

There is no tenet of modem racism theory which explicitly distinguishes
between the crime of rape and the crime of burglary as contexts for the expression of
modem racism effects (McConahay, 1986). However, it should be noted that,
although there is no doubt that both crimes can be seen to violate the values of the
Protestant work ethic, there is an aspect of the Protestant work ethic noted by
McConahay and Hough (1976) - sexual repression - which might have more

relevance for the crime of rape. Nevertheless, whether the crime is rape or burglary,
modem racism theory predicts that- when the evidence is balanced -jurors are able

to show racial bias without fear of being perceived as racist because, as noted above,
a juror can claim that he/she convicted the defendant because of the evidence - not

because of the defendant's race.
Although a number of studies have looked at the effects on the judgments of
jurors when a defendant has been charged with rape, relatively few have examined
this question when a defendant has been charged with theft (Mazzella & Feingold,
1994). In the meta-analysis referred to above which looked at the effects ofrace on
the judgments of mock jurors, Mazzella and Feingold noted only one study (Gleason
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& Harris, 1975) in which the crime was burglary and the dependant variable w:~s

guilt. (Five studies in which the crime was burglary used sentencing as the
dependant variable.) Given that Mazzella and Feingold listed IHstudies which used

a crime against the person as a stimulus, it is obvious that there has been a dearth of
mock juror studies which have looked at the effects of a defendant's race when the
crime is one against property.
ln the only study noted by Mazzella and Feingold (1994) in which the crime
was burglary and the dependant variable was guilt, Gleason and Harris (1975) found

no main effect for race. However, this finding needs to be interpreted in light of the
overall conclusions drawn by Mazzella and Feingold noted above: That is, that,

depending on the circumstances, the judgments of mock jurors are sometimes biased
in favour of blacks, and at other times are biased against blacks. Also, the temporal
context of the Gleason and Hanris study (i.e., the fact that it was conducted over
twenty years ago) and the specialised population from which the study's sample was
drawn (college students - all male) raises questions about the relevance of the
study's findings to the current social climate.
Thus there are two questions, with regards to the simulated jury paradigm,
which need to be addressed: (a) Will whites tend to discriminate against blacks
when a defendant has committed the crime of burglary (a crime with no physical
confrontation or assault)? (b) Will jury instructions nullify any discriminatory
behaviours against blacks which might occur (as suggested by Pfeifer & Ogloff,
1991)?

Implications of the ambivalent nature of modern racism for the juror task.
At this point it should be noted that Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991) made no

reference to the proposed ambivalent nature of modem racism. That is, it appears
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that PICifer and Oglo!T take the position that jury instructions alert mock jurors to
the fact that ntcial prejudice might be an issue so that jurors arc then able to put
aside their prejudices and make a decision which is racially unbiased. However,
consistent with the findings of extreme responses in the studies on helping
behaviours and hiring decisions noted above (e.g., Katz ct al., 1986; Gaertner &
Dovidio, 1977; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; McConahay, 1983), modem racism
theol)' predicts that when jurors are alerted to the fact that racial prejudice might be

an issue, they will tend to overcompensate and discriminate in favour of black
defendants (Gaertner and Dovidio, 1986). In fact, the data of Pfeifer and Ogloff do

give some indication of a (non-sigrlificant) trend consistent with modern racism
theory's prediction of extreme responses: In the black defendanUwhite victim
without instructions condition, 15 out of 18 (83%) particip2nts judged the defendant
guilty; In the black defendant/white victim with instructions condition, 10 out of f6
(62%) participants judged the defendant not guilty. In another juror simulation study
which manipulated race and included jul)' instructions, Shaw and Skolinck (1995, p.
324) found a "reverse racism effect" on individual judgments - but offered no
explanation for this finding. These findings, taken in conjunction with the overall
conclusion of Mazzella and Feingold (1994) noted above, give some support for the
notion that the juror simulation task may be susceptible to the effects of extreme

responses as proposed by modem racism theory. Thus, a third question which needs
to be addressed is: (c) Will jUI)' instructions result in reverse discrimination (i.e.,
judgments which discriminate in favour ofblacks)?

Jury instructions: How do they work?
As noted by Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991), the psychological mechanisms by

which jury instructions work warrants consideration. In interpreting their findings
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with respect to jury instructions, Pfeifer and Ogloff suggested two possible
explanations - both purportedly derived from facets of modern racism theory.
Firstly, Pfeifer and Ogloff suggested that participants might adhere to jury
instructions rather than to their prejudices because of ..social inhibitions placed on
blatant displays of racism" (p. 1715). That is, jury instructions may have alerted the
participants to the fact that racial prejudice might be an i"ue so that they adjusted
their judgments so as to appear non-prejudiced. Secondly, Pfeifer and Ogloff
suggested that jury instructions might "provide participants with guidelines that

enable them to focus on legally relevant information such as the elements of the
crime rather than on their prejudicial attitudes when evaluating the guilt of the
defendant" (p. 1721). With reference to modem racism theory, Pfeifer and Ogloff
added, "when the ambiguity in the guilt determination task was decreased by
supplying participants with jury instructions to guide their decision making, the level
of expressed juror prejudice dissipated" (p. 1721).
The first explanation of Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991) clearly relates to the
fundamental tenet of modem racism theory that individuals are only expected to
discriminate against blacks when they are unlikely to be perceived as being
prejudiced (McConahay, 1986). However, it is unclear how the second explanation
directly relates to modem racism theory. Although Pfeifer and Ogloff (p.l721) refer

to a decrease in "the ambiguity in the guilt determination task", the inconclusive
evidence (i.e., balanced evidence) still provides the participant with non-racial

factors to justify his/her behaviour. Social comparisons have not been made, nom1s
for behaviour (for this level of evidence) have not been established, and there is no
direct threat to the juror's non-prejudiced self image. In order to create norms to
guide behaviour (as McConahay, 1983, did in the job applicant study) it would be
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necessary to have a participant first judge a white defendant on a similar level of
evidence. If, for example, a participant judged a white defendant to be not guiltyhe/she would be unable to subsequently judge a black defendant to be guilty (on a

similar level of evidence) without running the risk of appearing to be prejudiced. In
fact, it is suggested that if the second explanation of Pfeifer and Ogloff is correct

(i.e., that when told to focus only on the evidence participants arc able to put aside
their prejudices and make a decision based only on the evidence)- then it is likely
that the juror task is a behavioural context not susceptible to the effects of modern
racism.
Thus, Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991) have offered two explanations for the

nullifying effects of jury instructions, one that is consistent with modern racism
theory, and one that is not. Firstly, a juror would not be expected to discriminate
against a black defendant when he/she perceives that racial prejudice might be an
issue (so that the juror's non-prejudiced self image is threatened). Secondly, a juror
would not be expected to discriminate against a black defendant when instructed to
focus only on the evidence. Since the jury instructions provided by Pfeifer and
Ogloff included both an element which referred to a need to allow "no prejudice to

influence your decision," and, an element which provided guidelines for not
indulging , in "speculations, conjectures, or inferences not supported by the
evidence", it is not clear whether participants were alerted to the fact that they must
be careful not to appear prejudiced, or if participants were able to put aside their
racial prejudices as a result of being instructed not to indulge in speculations not
supported by the evidence. Two different types of instructions might therefore have
implications for the decision making task of mock jurors: (a) instructions which
direct the participant to be guided only by the evidence presented to them
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("evidence"), and (b) instructions which instruct the participant to be non-prejudiced
("non-prejudice").

Thus, with regards to the question of how instructions work, a further two
questions need to be addressed: (a) What type of jury instructions ("evidence"

instructions, or "non-prejudice" instructions) nullify racially discriminating biases in
a simulated jury task? And (b) What type of jury instructions (if any) will result in

behaviours which discriminate in favour of blacks (consistent with the proposed
ambivalent nature of modem racism)?
Australian Aborigines and the Legal System

The fact that the imprisonment rate of Aborigines has been a cause for much
concern in Australia is reflected in the following words of O'Neill and Handley
(1994, p.419):
It is a notorious fact which has been emphasised many times and

reaffirmed by the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in
Custody that Aboriginals are greatly over-represented in the
population held in police custody and in prison ... Aboriginal
imprisonment rates have increased both during and since the Royal

Commission.
The imprisonment rate of Aborigines is of particular concern in the state of Western
Australia. Martin and Newby (1984) estimated that appro,imately a third of prison
inmates and a fifth of court charges in any one year were drawn from an Aboriginal
minority of2.5% of the state population.
O'Neill and Handley (1994) noted that, histmically, there has been

systematic discrimination shown against Aborigines: discrimination in areas such as
the application of the civil law to Aboriginals, voting rights, and industrial rights

Modern Racism 25

(including discriminatory practices

m dctennining Aborigines'

wages, and

discriminatory laws which enabled the authorities and other powers to sti flc the
spread of trade unionism among Aborigines). Although many improvements have
been made with regards to Aborigines and the law, discriminatory practices within
the legal system remain (Thorpe, 1987). O'Neill and Handley noted that Aboriginal
people are much more likely than whites to be arrested for criminal offences and,
once arrested, to be denied bail. Street offences, public drunl(enness in particular, are
administered in such a way that the decision of whether a suspected offender is
arrested is left to the subjective discretion of individual police officers - and these
laws are still used more often and more punitively against Aboriginals (O'Neill and
Handley).
Although the types of discriminatory practices noted above are well
documented, there has been no experimental research conducted to explore the
potential for white Australians to discriminate against Aborigines in a criminal
justice system context. Indeed, as noted earlier, there has been virtually no
experimental research done on racism in Australia. Given the rates of imprisonment
of Aborigines in Australia, the social importance of such research is self evident.

Purpose and Rationale of the Present Study
A fundamental tenet of modem racism theory is that racial discrimination is
largely detennined by behavioural context - and a review of the literature supports
this position. A critical issue, then, is to identify the nature of the behavioural
contexts in which one might expect to find racial discrimination. The purpose of the
present study was to explore the boundaries ofthese behavioural contexts by testing
the predictions of modem racism theory in the decision-making task of jurors - a
behavioural context which, by its very nature, is explicit in its expectations of a
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commitment to an egalitarian ideal. That is, individuals who take on the task of a
juror understand that all should be treated equally under the law. The word 'justice",

in itself, suggests that everyone should be treated equally, regardless of race, creed
or colour. Thus, the focus of this study was to test for the effects of subtle
expressions of racism predicted by modern racism theory in a behavioural context
which explicitly forbids participants (i.e., jurors) from being innuenced by racist
perspectives. Specifically, the present study was designed to address the three

critical questions generated from a review of the literature:
1. Do non-Aboriginal Australians tend to discriminate against Aborigines when an
Aboriginal defendant has committed the crime of burglary (a crime with no
physical confrontation or assault)?
2. Do jury instructions nullify any discriminatory behaviours against Aboriginal
defendants which might occur?

3. Do jury instructions result in reverse discrimination (i.e., judgments which
discriminate in favour of Aboriginal defendants)?
The study.

One of the major limitations of previous studies - both in modem racism
research and in simulated juror research- has been the poor sampling methods. The
vast majority of studies (particularly experimental studies) have drawn their samples
from populations of students (Duckitt, 1991; Katz & Hass, 1988). This is an issue of

particular concern for studies that examine racism because it has been a consistent
finding that university students (and university educated individuals generally) tend
to show relatively low levels of prejudice (Augoustinos et al., 1994; Larsen, 1981;
Pedersen & Walker, 1997). In order to obtain results which might be truly
representative of the general community, the present study used a multistage cluster
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sampling technique (sec de Vaus, 1995) to oht:1in a large. representative sample of
the city of Perth in Western Australia.

A simulated juror paradigm was used in which participants read a summary
of a trial. The trial involved

H

man accused of burglary~ a crime considered suitable

as a generic test case for the juror dccision~making context. The defendant in the
case was accused of breaking and entering a suburban household and stealing a
VCR (valued at $1,800) and $250 in cash. The case for the prosecution included

testimonies from a range of witnesses including the victim, the defendant, and the
arresting police officer. The evidence was balanced. That is, pilot testing had shown
that respondents were as likely to convict the defendant as they were to acquit the
defendant.
The defendant (presented to participants in the fonn of a photograph, or

"mugshot") was either an Aboriginal or Caucasian man aged in his mid-to-late 20s.
In order to eliminate any confounds which might be raised by any idiosyncratic
characteristics of a particular Aborigine or a particular Caucasian, the photographs
of four Aborigines and four Caucasians were used within each race condition. Thus,
a participant in the Aborigine condition was presented with the photograph of one
Aborigine randomly selected from a pool of four. A control condition (with no
photograph and no mention of race) was also included so that responses of
participants with photographs could be compared to the responses of participants
who had only the evidence on which to base their decisions.
The type of jury instructions was also manipulated. In order to test the
explanations offered by Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991) for the nullifying effects of jury

instructions, three types of instructions were included: none, instructions which
directed participants to respond without prejudice ("without prejudice instructions")

Modem Racism 28

and instructions whid1 directed participants not to indulge m speculations not
supported by the evidence ("evidence instructions").
The primary dependent variable was dichotomous- that is participants were
asked to judge the defendant as either guilty or not guilty. Following this judgment,
participants were invited to respond to the open-ended question, "why?" The reasons
for including this question were twofold. Firstly, the question was included in order
to check that any discrimination that did occur was indeed a product of modem
racism. For example, if a respondent judged an Aborigine to be guilty because of his
race (e.g., "because he is an Aborigine and they can't be trusted"), then the

respondent would be demonstrating old-fashioned racism - not modem racism.
Secondly, the question was included in order to gain access to the types of
attributions and justifications that participants might offer to support their judgment

-elements which have been identified as defining characteristics of modem racism
(McConahay, 1986).

Participants were also asked to indicate their confidence in their judgment
(i.e., their guilty/not guilty judgment) on a 7-point Iikert scale. This question has

relevance to the real life situation in which an individual juror's judgment only has
relevance to the final outcome of a trial to the extent that he/she is prepared to argue
the validity of his/her decision within the deliberation process of a jury. For
example, it would be expected that an individual who has high confidence in his/her
judgment would be likely to argue his/her case strongly and consequently have a
greater impact on the final outcome.
Finally, participants were asked to indicate the likelihood that the defendant

committed the crime regardless of how they might judge him as a juror. The
purpose of this question was to explore any of the subtleties (the subtle nature of
modem racism effects have been emphasised in both the studies on helping
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behaviours, e.g .• Gaer ncr & Dovidio, 1986, and the studies on aggrcssJon, r.;.g.,
Donncrstein, ct a!., I 972) that might emerge in the decision-making process of the
participants. The 2 X 3 (race X instruction) design was analysed using Jog-linear
(guilt

CIS

dependant variable) and ANOVA (personal opinion and confidence as

dependant variables) analytical procedures. A weighted one-way chi-square analysis
was used to compare the race conditions to the control condition. In addition, the
qualitative data were content analysed and compared across conditions using 2-way
~hi-square

and ANOV A analytical procedures.

According to modem racism theory it was predicted that, in the "no
instructions" and the "evidence instructions" conditions, participants would be more
likely to find an Aboriginal defendant guilty than a Caucasian defendant because, as
noted above, they would be able to point to rton-racial frtctors (i.e., the balanced
evidence) to justify a behaviour that is biased against blacks. In the "without
prejudice instructions" condition, however, it was predicted that participants would
be alerted to the fact that racial prejudice might be an issue, and that they would
adjust their judgement accordingly. Thus, it is expected that there will be an
interaction between race of defendant and type of instructions.
Modem racism theory is not specific in discriminating between the
conditions which might produce no bias and the conditions which might produce
reverse bias (i.e., participants discriminating in favour of blacks as a result of
overcompensating in an effort to appear non-prejudice). With reference to situations
in which individuals would be likely to be concerned about appearing prejudiced,
McConahay stated that "positive or [emphasis added] overly positive behaviour"
would be expected. Consequently, the prediction for the "without prejudice
instructions" condition was simply that there would be no discrimination against the
Aboriginal defendant.
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Method
Participants

A discussion on the participants ror the present study nccUs to he prefaced
with some comments on the contextual nature of' the study. Although the overall
goal or this study was to test predictions derived from a general theory or racism
(i.e., the theory of modern racism) the study has done so by examining how non·
aboriginal residents of the city of Perth respond to Australian A horiginals·. Thus the
goal of the sampling process was to select a sample which, first and foremost, is
representative of the population of the Australian city of Perth.

Sa111pling procedure.
A multistage cluster sampling technique (de Vaus, 1995), incorporating two
stages, was used to randomly select participants for the study. A sample area of the
Perth Metropolitan region was created by drawing boundaries on a map of the city
of Perth so that, as much as possible, non-urban areas (such as rural and semi-rural
districts, national parks, and industrial areas) were excluded from the sample area
(see Appendix A for a detailed description of the areas sampled). The 56 reference
maps from the Streetsmart Perth

Street Directory (Department of Land

Administration and West Australian Newspapers, 1997) corresponding to the
sampling area defined above were used to represent the regions in the first stage of
the cluster sampling process. SPSS (version 7) was used to randomly select six
reference maps from the total 56 maps (each stage was designed such that the
sampling area was reduced by approximately 10% as recommended by de Vaus,
1995). Each reference map (in the Streetsmart Perth Street Directory) is divided into
50 grids. For each of the six maps, SPSS was used to randomly select 5 grids from
the 50. Thus, the multistage cluster sampling technique produced 30 sampling areas
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(grids) covering 22 suburbs of Perth. The areas were sampled on week-ends (43%1 of'
tot:.J!) week days (21%) of total) and week day evenings (35%1 of total) with an
overall response rate of 66'% (sec Appendix A for a detailed description of the
sampling procedure).
The sample.
Using the above technique 338 residents from the metropolitan area of Perth
were selected as participants for this study. Only residents over the age of 18 and
who had lived in Australia for at least two years were asked to participate (i.e., those
who were old enough to serve on a jury and would be familiar with Aboriginal
stereotypes that may exist in Perth). A comparison of demographic data for the

sample ( including gender, age, level of education, political affiliation, occupation,
country of birth, and years lived in Australia) with Perth data from the 1996 census
(Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1996a; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1996b;
Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1996c) and the Western Australian results of the
1998 Federal election (Australian Electoral Commission, 1998), indicated that the
sample deviated only slightly from the population. A summary of demographic
details of the sample is shown in Table I (see Appendix B for full details). Overall

this sample was considered to be an excellent representative sample of the city of
Perth.
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Table I
Sample Demographics

Demographic

N

%

Male

155

45.9

Female

180

53.3

3

0.9

Total

338

100

18-24

48

14.2

25-30

42

12.4

31-34

51

15.1

35-40

53

15.7

40+

144

42.6

Total

338

100.0

61

18.0

131

38.8

Tertiary Degree (incomplete)

40

11.8

Tertiary Degree (complete)

41

12.1

Postgraduate Degree

26

7.7

Tafe

34

10.1

5

1.5

338

100.0

Gender

Missing

Age

Education
High School (incomplete)
High School (complete)

Missing
Total
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f:thical Considerations

Participants were in!brmcd that the research study was being carried out as
part of a course requirement for a student at Edith Cowan University. Participants
were then told the time commitment involved, that taking part in the study was
entirely voluntary, and that the questionnaire would be picked up the following day.
The first page of the questionnaire stated that the study was being carried out as part
of a course requirement for a student at Edith Cowan Umversity, emphasised that
participation was voluntary, and made assurances about the anonymity and
confidentiality of the information gathered. The first page also included contact
numbers for both the student and his supervisor (see Appendix C for a copy of the
questionnaire).
All participants (regardless of whether they had completed the questionnaire
or not) were thanked for their participation and debriefed as to the real purposes of
the study (see Appendix D for a copy of the infonnation included in the debriefing
procedure). In one particular case, a potential participant expressed concern that the
response he made as a mock juror might have real implications for the defendant. He
was immediately debriefed as to the true nature of the study and did not take part as
a participant.

Materials
The questionnaire included directions to the participants regarding the
procedure they were to follow. The first page of the questionnaire stated that the
study was being carried out as part of a course requirement for a student at Edith
Cowan University. The second page of the questionnaire began with a statement
about the purpose of the study: "to test the capacity of mock jurors to make a
judicial decision based upon a summarised version of a trial transcript (such as those
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found in law reports). A comparison will he muUc between the judgements made by
real jurors, and the judgements mnde by mock jurors." Tile second page also
included instructions lOr the participants about the procedure they were to follow:
The trial summary you me about to read is a real case. It has been
selected randomly from the Westem Australian Law Reports (19921996). All the infonnation given in the law report has been
reproduced here. Your task will be to carefully read the summary and
answer questions about the guilt I non-guilt of the defendant.
The second page concluded with the following instructions:
Please take careful note of each piece of information as it is
presented. You are asked to read through the summary of the
evidence once, and once only, before answering the questions which
follow it. There are 4 questions. Please answer them in the order
presented.
The questionnaire also included the trial summary. The trial summary was
comprised of three discrete elements: the presentation of the facts of the case
(including the case for the prosecution and the case for the defence); the judge's
instructions to the jurors; and the photographs of the defendants (the means by
which the race of the defendant was defined). The development of each element is
outlined in detail below.

The presentation of the facts.
The goal in developing the evidence for the fictional case was to produce
evidence that was balanced. That is, evidence which, when presented to a group of
participants (playing the role of mock jurors), would result in 50% of the
participants judging the defendant to be guilty, and 50% of the participants judging
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the defendant to be not guilty. Balanced evidence is desirable because it minimist:s
the possibility

or

Ooor or ceiling effects {i.e., all participants, regardless of

condition, judging the defendant to be not guilty, or all of the participants judging
the defendant to be guilty).
An existing experimental trial summary (Miller, 1997) was modified for the

present study (see Appendix E for a detailed account of- and rationale for - the
modifications made). The refined version of the trial summary was presented to 22
participants (12 male, I 0 female) randomly selected from five suburbs or Perth. The

results showed that the evidence was balanced in that, when no instructions were
included, 50% (II of 22) of the participants judged the defendant to be guilty.
The crime was burglary - the defendant was accused of breaking and
entering a suburban premises and stealing a VCR (valued at $1,800) and $250 in

cash. The case for the prosecution included testimonies from a neighbour of the
victim (who described a car leaving the crime scene), the victim (who identified the
VCR found in the defendant's possession as the one stolen from her house), a police
sergeant (who attended the crime scene and found the VCR in the back of the
defendant's car), a bar attendant (who saw the defendant leave a hotel with time to
commit the burglary), and a neighbour of the defendant (who did not see the
defendant's car in his car bay at the time that the crime was committed). The case
for the defence included testimonies from a friend of the defendant (who was at the
hotel with the defendant on the night of the crime), and the defendant (who claimed
that the VCR was his). Essentially, from a juror's perspective, the evidence was
circumstantial and the central question was one of identity. That is, could the
defendant be identified as the person who had committed a known crime? (See
Appendix C for the full transcript as presented to the participants).
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.l11dge 's instructions to lite jurors.
The primary goal in formulating the wording of the instructions was not to
produce instructions which would necessarily be representative of instructions
actually used in courts, hut to produce concise instructions such that the
interpretation of the effects of different types of the instructions could be

mad~

with

the minimum of ambiguity. The specific wording of the "without prejudice" ancl the
"evidence" instmctions were developed from the instructions used by Pfeifer and
Ogloff (1991 ). The "without prejudice" instructions were:
Judge: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this concludes the evidence
in this case. It is now your responsibility, without sympathy or
prejudice, to detennine if the prosecution has successfully discharged
their burden of proof. The law demands of you that you allow no
prejudice to influence you in arriving at your verdict. If there is
reasonable doubt in your mind, you must find the defendant not
guilty. Ifthere is no reasonable doubt in your mind, you must find the
defendant guilty as charged.
The "evidence" instructions were:
Judge: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this concludes the evidence
in this case. It is now your responsibility to determine if the
prosecution has successfully discharged their burden of proof.

In

determining any questions of fact presented in this case, you should
be governed solely by the evidence introduced before you. You
should not indulge in speculations, conjectures, or inferences not
supported by the evidence. If there is reasonable doubt in your mind,
you must find the defendant not guilty. Ifthere is no reasonable doubt
in your mind, you must find the defendant guilty as charged.
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In the "no instructions" condition, participants were given enly the criteria by which

guilt was to be detem1incd, that is, "reasonable doubt":
Judge: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this concludes the evidence

in this case. It is now your responsibility to determine if the
prosecution has successfully discharged their burden of proof. If there

is reasonable doubt in your mind, you must find the defendant not
guilty. lfthere is no reasonable doubt in your mind, you must find the
defendant guilty as charged.
In order to check that the instructions did not affect the guilt determinations
of mock jurors when no race was mentioned, 41 (15 male, 26 female) participants
randomly selected from five suburbs of Perth were randomly allocated to either a

"without prejudice" condition or an "evidence" condition. The results showed that,
in the "evidence" condition, the evidence was balanced in that 50% (10 of20) of the
participants judged the defendant to be guilty.
However, when the participants were instructed to judge the defendant
"without sympathy or prejudice", 75% (15 of 20) of the participants judged the
defendant to be guilty. It was concluded that there were three possibilities for this
finding, (a) participants were reacting to the word "prejudice" by being more likely
to judge the defendant guilty than not guilty, (b) participants were reacting to the
word "sympathy" by being more likely to judge the defendant guilty than not guilty,
or (c) the finding represented an unreliable result. Further pilot testing indicated that
the finding was reliable. It was concluded that, when the participants were instructed
to make their decision without prejudice - they assumed that the defendant was

Aboriginal, and were subsequently biased in their responses because, as race was not

mentioned, there was no threat to the non-prejudiced self image ofparticipants.
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In spite of the above findings the expectations with respect to the main study
remained the same. For example, it was expected that when participants were
presented with a Caucasian defendant in the "without prejudice" condition, this
effect will disappear. That is, when the defendant is Cauca:>ian, participants will no
longer surmise that the defendant is Aboriginal and would therefore be as likely to
judge tlte defendant not guilty as they would be to judge the defendant guilty.
[twas also predicted that this effect would disappear when the defendant was

Aboriginal (in the "without prejudice" condition) - because once race was made
salient (one ofthe conditions identified by McConahay, 1986, for positive behaviour
toward blacks) the participants would perceive the possibility of being seen as
prejudiced. Thus, although the findings with respect to the "without prejudice"

condition in the pilot studies were unexpected, the expectations with respect to the
main study remained the same.
It should also be noted that, as a result of the pilot studies, the word

"sympathy" was removed from the "without prejudice" instruction because it was
deemed to represent a possible confound (see Appendix F for a full account of the
pilot testing and the rationale for the above conclusions.)

Photographs ofthe defendant.
The race of the defendant was defined by a photograph of either a Caucasian

or an Aboriginal man. In order to ensure that any variation in guilt judgments could
be confidently attributed to race rather than to any individual characteristics of a

particular member of a race, it was decided to use four men to represent each of the
race conditions. The eight photographic mouels were selected from a pool of ten.
Photographic models selected into the initial pool of ten were either Aboriginal or
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Caucasian, male, between the ages of 24 and 30, and of "working class appearance"
(as judged by two independent field researchers).
In order to choose the eight most appropriate subjects (and to ensure that,

e.g., the Caucasian subjects were not particularly attracLivc, and the Aboriginal
subjects particularly unattractive), the ten photographs were rated along a number of
dimensions by 120 university students: attractiveness, how likeable they were, and
perceived age (each photograph was rated by 12 of the students).' Participants were
also asked to state what racial group they thought the photographic model belonged
to (see Appendix G for a copy of the rating survey).
The mean attractiveness and likable ratings for the Aboriginal photographs
was 2.6 and 3.0 respectively. The mean attractiveness and likable ratings for the
Caucasian photographs was 2.8 and 3.6 respectively. One of the Aboriginal subjects
was not recognised as being Aboriginal by two of the participants and was dropped
from the set of photographic stimuli. In order to match the two racial groups as
closely as possible the Caucasian with the highest attractive and likable ratings was
dropped. This elimination process produced a final set of eight photographs with no
significant differences in ratings of attractiveness, likabli!ity, or age (see Table 2).
See Appendix H for copies ofthe eight photographs used in the trial summary.

5

It is necessary to establish equivalence of attractiveness for photographic models because it is an
established finding that attractive and/or likable defendants are less likely to be found guilty
(Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). Although one might question this practice on the grounds that there
could be a race effect for attractiveness to begin with (i.e., whites find Aboriginals less attractive than
whites), previous researchers have found race effects with stimuli that have been matched on
attractiveness (see, e.g., McConahay, 1983; Shaw & Skolinck, 1995). In order to minimise the
possibility of race effects in the rating process, university students, who have been found to have
relatively low scores on the modem racism scale (Augoustinos eta!., 1994; Pederson & Walker,
1997), were chosen as ratees.
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Table 2

Mean Ratings of Attractiveness, Likability, and Age Assigned to Photographic
Stimuli (Defendants)
Attractive

Race

Likable

Age

Aboriginal
M

2.50

2.80

27.6

SD

.32

.12

3.1

M

2.60

3.40

27.3

SD

.80

.48

2.6

Caucasian

Procedure

The sampling procedure is described above. Participants were randomly
assigned to conditions (the number of participants were spread evenly across
conditions in each sampling area.) Participants were infonned that the study was
being carried out as part of a research course requirement for a student at Edith
Cowan University. They were then told that the purpose of the st"dy was to examine
the decision-making task of jurors and that their task would be to read through the
summary of a burglary trial and then answer a few questions about the guilt I non
guilt of the defendant (at this point, participants were shown a sample of the trial
summary so that they could get an idea of its length). It was explained to participants
who enquired further about the nature of the study that: "It is important that
everybody approaches the task with the same infonnation. When the questionnaire is
picked up, you will be given further background infonnation about the study.
Participants were then told the time commitment involved, that taking part in the
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study was entirely voluntary, and that the questionnaire would he picked up the
following day. They were then invited to participate. The questionnaires were
picked up the following day. Those people who had not completed the task were
given ;mother day to do so.
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Results

An alpha level of .05 was used !Or all statistical tests, and all statistical
assumptions were deemed to be satisfied. The frequencies and percentages of guilty

I not guilty judgments for each cxpcrimcntul condition arc shown in Table 3. A log
linear analysis pcrfonned on the dichotomous guilty I not guilty verdicts and the
independent variables of race (Aboriginal and Caucasian) and instructions (none,
"without prejudice", and "evidence") revealed no overall relationship between race
and guilt determinations,;('(!, N= 287) = 1.59,p = .21 and no overall relationship
between instructions and guilt determinations

x2(2, N = 287) = 1.31, p = .52. There

was also no interaction found between race and instructions with regards to guilt
determinations,

x2(2, N = 287) = 1.82, p = .40. That is,

race of the defendant and

type of instructions had no significant effect upon the guilt determinations of

participants. A weighted one-way chi-square analysis of the six experimental
conditions and the control condition perfonned on the guilty judgments only, also
revealed no effect,

x2(6,

N = 196) = 2.82, p = .83. Thus, there was no difference

between the proportion of guilty to not guilty judgments in the conditions that had
photographs of a defendant, and the proportion of guilty to not guilty judgments in
the control condition- which did not include a photograph of a defendant.
The confidence ratings for the guilty and not guilty judgments were analysed
separately. The confidence ratings for the guilty and not guilty judgments are shown
in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively. Two 2 x 3 (race x instructions) between subjects
ANOV As were performed on the confidence ratings for the guilty and not guilty
judgments, revealing no effects, F(5, 165) = 1.67, p = .15 and F(5, 110) = .22, p =
.95 respectively.
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Table 3

The Frequencies am/% of Guilty I Not Guilty.!udgmentsfi;r Aboriginal and
Caucasian Defendants hy Type of Instruction
Guilt

Instructions
None

Evidence

Non-Prejudice

Race

Guilty

Total

Not Guilty

Aboriginal

28 (60%)

18 (39%)

46 (100%)

Caucasian

28 (62%)

17 (37%)

45 (100%)

Total

56 (62%)

35 (39%)

91(1 00%)

Aboriginal

30 (64%)

17 (36%)

47(1 00%)

Caucasian

21 (46%)

25 (54%)

46(1 00%)

Total

51 (55%)

42 (45%)

93(1 00%)

Aboriginal

33 (65%)

!8 (35%)

51(!00%)

Caucasian

31 (60%)

21 (40%)

52(100%)

Total

64 (62%)

39 (38%)

!03(100%)

25 (49%)

26 (51%)

51(100%)

!96 (58%)

142 (42%)

338 (100%)

Control
Total

Table 4

Mean Confidence Ratings of Guilty Judgments for Aborigbwl and Caucasian

Defendants by Type ofInstruction
Caucasian

Aboriginal

SD

M

SD

Instructions

M

None

6.21

.99

28

6.32

.82

28

Evidence

6.50

.73

30

5.86

1.01

21

Non-Prejudice

6.03

.85

33

6.16

.93

31

Total

6.24

.87

91

6.14

.92

80

II

II
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Table 5

Niemi Confidence Ratings of Not Guilty Judgments for Aboriginal and Cauca,w'an
Defendants by ?)1pe of Instruction

Caucasian

Aboriginal
M

SD

18

5.00

1.27

17

1.97

17

5.04

1.54

25

5.06

1.26

18

5.05

!.47

21

4.83

!.67

53

5.03

!.43

63

Instructions

M

SD

None

4.78

1.80

Evidence

4.65

Non-Prejudice
Total

ll

ll

The likelihood ratings for the guilty and not guilty judgments were also
analysed separately. The likelihood ratings for the guilty and not guilty judgments
are shown in Table 6 and Table 7 respectively. Two 2 x 3 (race x instructions)
between subjects ANOV As perfonmed on the likelihood ratings for the guilty and
not guilty judgments were not significant, F(S, 165) = .63,p = .68 and F(S, 110) =
1.09, p = .37 respectively.
Table 6
Mean Likelihood Ratings of Guilty Judgments for Aboriginal and Caucasian
Defendants by Type oflnstruction

Caucasian

Aboriginal

SD

n

M

SD

Instructions

M

None

6.32

.98

28

6.39

.74

28

Evidence

6.30

!.21

30

6.05

.67

21

Non-Prejudice

6.42

.61

33

6.42

.81

31

Total

6.35

.95

91

6.31

.76

80

ll
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Table 7

Mean Likelihood Ratings of Not Guilty Judgments for Ahorigina/ and Caucasian
Defendants by 1}pe of Instruction

Caucasian

Aboriginal
M

SD

II

18

5.53

1.42

17

1.38

17

5.56

1.58

25

5.06

1.26

18

4.71

1.35

21

5.13

1.26

53

5.27

1.49

63

Instructions

M

SD

None

5.17

1.20

Evidence

5.18

Non-Prejudice
Total

II

The qualitative data gathered from the question "why [did you judge the
defendant to be guilty I not guilty]?" were content analysed. There was a 94.9%
response rate to the question. To check for reliability in the coding of the responses
an independent judge repeated the procedure for the first 100 participants producing
a 78% agreement (see Appendix I for a complete guideline of the classification
coding for the qualitative data). One participant gave an indication of old fashioned

racism. That is, she offered "because he is an Aborigine" as a reason for judging the
defendant guilty. The data were not comparable across the guilty I not guilty
responses and the two groups were therefore analysed separately.
The coding process for the guilty group revealed that there were three

definitive types of responses by participants: responses which listed pieces of
evidence to support the guilty judgroent; responses which listed speculations to
support the guilty judgment; and responses which simply made a general statement
to the effect that the evidence was too strong. Evidence refers to facts which either
(a) linked the defendant to the scene, (b) established that the video belonged to the
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victim, or (c) referred to the defendant's lack of an alibi. Speculation refers to
statements which (a) mid strength to pieces of evidence by speculating about the
likelihood of them being true, (b) cast doubts upon the veracity of the defendant's
testimony based upon unsupported spcculation(s) about the defendant's behaviour,
or (c) either slate or imply that the defendant is lying or is unreliable. The numbers
of participants offering evidence or speculations were 151 and 99 respectively. Only
10 participants (4 Aboriginal conditions, 6 Caucasian conditions) gave a general
statement without any evidence or speculations, and these participants were dropped
from any further qualitative analysis. A 2-way chi-square analysis perfonned on the
participants who offered evidence revealed that instruction type and race of
defendant had no influence on whether or not participants were likely to offer
evidence, x'(2, N = 133) = .18, p

= .92. (see Table 8 for frequencies or responses by

race and type of instruction). A 2 x 3 (race x instructions) ANOVA performed on the
number of pieces of evidence participants offered to support their judgments was not
significant, F(5, 127) = .519,p = .76 (see Table 8 for the group means).
Table 8

Means and Frequencies of Participants Who Listed Evidence to Justify Guilty
Judgments for Aboriginal and Caucasian Defendants by Type of Instruction
Aboriginal
Instructions

M

SD

None

2.33

1.05

Evidence

2.36

Non-Prejudice
Total

Caucasian

M

SD

N

24

2.70

1.17

20

.95

22

2.18

.88

17

2.46

1.17

26

2.50

1.14

24

2.39

1.06

72

2.48

1.09

61

II
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A 2-way chi-square analysis perfonncd on the responses of participants who
offered speculation(s) revealed that instruction type and race of defendant had no

influence on whether or not participants were likely to offer speculations,

z2(2, N =

84) = 1.1 G, p = .56 (see Table 9 for frequencies of responses by race and type of

instruction). As the cell sizes in the speculation data were relatively small, the data
were collapsed across instructions and an independent /-test was performed to see if

.

there was an effect for race. It too was not significant, t(82) = 1.29, p = .20. The

mean number of speculations for the Aboriginal defendant group and the Caucasian
defendant group were 1.50 (SD = .70) and 1.33 (SD =.53) respectively.
Table 9

Frequencies of Participants Who Listed Speculations to Justify Guilty Judgments for

Aboriginal and Caucasian Defendants by Type of Instruction
Aboriginal

Caucasian

Total

None

15

17

32

Evidence

13

8

21

Non-Prejudice

16

15

31

Total

44

40

84

Instructions

The coding process of the not guilty group revealed that there were only two

types of responses: participants either listed weak points in the prosecution's case
(weak points) or simply made a generalised statement indicating that the evidence
was inconclusive (see Appendix I for examples). A 2-way chi-square analysis
perfonned on the participants who listed weak points revealed that instruction type
and race of defendant had no influence on whether or not participants were likely to
2

list weak points, X (2, N = 69) = .196, p = .91 (see Table 10 for frequencies of
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responses by race and type of instmction). An independent Hcst performed on the
weak points data found no effect for race, t(67) = -.87, p = .39. The mean number of
weak points listed by participants in the Aboriginal

d~fcndant

group and the

Caucasian defendant group were !.59 (SD = .70) and 1.79 (SD = .78) respectively.
See Appendix J for the computer printout of the statistical tests conducted.
Table 10
Frequencies of Participants Who Listed Weak Points to Justify Not Guilty

Judgments for Aboriginal and Caucasian Defendants by Type of Instruction
Aboriginal

Caucasian

Total

None

12

II

23

Evidence

II

13

24

Non-Prejudice

II

II

22

Total

34

35

6Y

Instructions
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Discussion
Based on the predictions of modern racism theory it was hypothesised that,
with balanced evidence, non-Aboriginal Australians would be more likely to judge
an Aboriginal defendant guilty than a Caucasian defendant because they would be
able to point to the evidence to justify their decision. That is, non-Aboriginal
Australians would be able to point to non-racial factors to justify a behaviour that
was biased against a racial minority and thus maintain an egalitarian self-concept (or
egalitarian public image). The results of this study, however, did not support this

hypothesis. Regardless of which type of instructions to participants were included
(i.e., none, instmctions to make a decision without prejudice, or instructions to make
a decision based only on the evidence), the results failed to indicate that nonAboriginal Australians tend to make judgments which are biased against Aboriginal

defendants. Furthennore, the results failed to indicate that mock jurors who are
presented with a photograph of a defendant are likely to be unduly influenced by the
appearance of the defendant (as shown by the comparison of the judgments of

participants in the experimental conditions to the control condition). Thus it appears
that mock jurors are able to ignore extra-legal infonnation (such as the appearance
of the defendant) and focus upon the evidence when determining the guilt of a
defendant.
There were also no significant differences found in the ratings of confidence
in judgment. That is, both groups of respondents (i.e., those who judged the
defendant to be guilty, and those who judged the defendant to be not guilty) were
equally confident in their decisions, regardless of the race of the defendant or the
type of instructions given by the judge. Similarly, there were no significant
differences found in the ratings of likelihood (i.e., "the likelihood that the defendant
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committed the crime regardless of how you might have judged them as a juror").
Thus, the participants thought that a Caucasian was as likely as an Aboriginal to
have committed the crime, were as likely to judge a Caucasian to be guilty as to
judge an Aboriginal to be guilty - and, having made their judgment, were as
confident in their decision when the defendant was a Caucasian as when he was an
Aboriginal.
In response to the open ended question "why [did you judge the defendant to
be guilty I not guilty]?" only one participant referred to an Aboriginal defendant's

race as a reason for judging him guilty. This is an indication that (as supporters of
modern racism theory have suggested) the expression of old fashioned racism
attitudes is not the norm in today's social climate.
The results of the content analysis of the qualitative data gathered from the

'

open ended question support the findings from the quantitative data. Regardless of

race or instruction type, participants tended to offer the same number of "pieer.s of
evidence" and the same number of "suppositions" (see results section for coding of
qualitative data) to support their decisions. (Note that comparisons were made across
experimental conditions but within type of guilt decision because the nature of
responses given for guilty decisions were not directly comparable to not guilty
decisions.) That is, analysis of the qualitative data revealed no differences in either
the type of support participants offered for their decision - or in the amount of
support participants felt they needed to offer in order to justify their decision. Thus,
it appears there was no difference (between race conditions) in the way participants
justified their decision (e.g., those who judged an Aboriginal defendant guilty did

not tend to offer "suppositions" rather than "evidence" to support their decision) nor did they tend to offer an inordinate number of justifications for their decision.
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For example, it seems that par1icipants neither felt that one needs less justification to
find an Aboriginal guilty, nor did they feel the need to offer more support to justify a

guilty decision made against an Aboriginal (as a way, e.g., to overcompensate for
what might be considered to be a racially prejudiced decision). Thus, there was no
indication of any subtle expressions of racial discrimination in the justifications
participants offered for their guilt detenninations.
The other aspect of the findings is that, regardless of the type of instruction,

there was no evidence of the reverse bias suggested by Modem Racism theory. That
is, the results gave no indication that non-Aboriginal Australians are more likely to
judge a Caucasian defendant as guilty than an Aboriginal defendant as guilty - as a
result of overcompensating in an effort to appear non-prejudiced. Thus, it might well
be that the position taken by Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991) is correct, that mock jurors
are able to put aside any generic prejudices they might hold and make an unbiased
decision based objectively on the evidence that is presented to them.
Before examining possible interpretations for the above results, this
discussion will begin with a consideration of the reliability of the findings. That is,
can the study's failure to find any significant differences be attributed to a lack of

power, sampling bias, or some fundamental problem with the research materials
(i.e., the summary of the trial, or the photographs of the defendants)?
With regards to power, the present study had a more than sufficient sample
size (with a minimum expected cell size of 18 in the log linear analysis) to detect
any meaningful effects if they were in the population to b• found. Although, in the
sample, the participants did tend to be more likely to judge the Aboriginal
defendants to be guilty than the Caucasian defendants, the effect size for race of r ~
.07 was extremely small when compared to the effect size of r

~

.25 found in the
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Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991) study. Thus, the study's failure to find support for the
hypothesis cannot be attributed to a lack of power. Similarly, it is unlikely that the

nonsignificant result can be due to sampling bias. The sampling procedure was
rigorous. Particular attention was given to the randomisation of participants across
experimental conditions. It could be argued that (with a response rate of 66%) the

34% who declined to participate represented the "racist" proportion of the

population. However this is unlikely for two reasons: Firstly, a 66% response rate is
an acceptable level (de Vaus, 1995) and does not indicate that there has been any
systematic refusals for reasons above and beyond what might be expected (e.g., "too
busy"; "simply not interested"). Secondly, a comparison of the sample (both across
and within experimental conditions) to the population showed no appreciable

differences across a range of demographic variables (see "participants" section).

Thus, it is concluded that the findings are not due to any characteristics peculiar to
the sample.
Similarly, it is unlikely that the result is an artifact of the materials because
the development and testing of the materials was also rigorous. The control
condition (when no photographs of defendants were included) confinned the
findings from the pilot studies, that the evidence presented was indeed balanced in
the sense that when no race was mentioned participants were as likely to judge the
defendant guilty as not guilty. Furthermore, when the photographs were introduced,
no floor or ceiling effects resulted. Thus, it is concluded that the trial summary
stimulus was sensitive enough to reveal any differences due to race ifthey existed. It
is also concluded that the photographs clearly represented the respective races
(Aboriginal and Caucasian), because the ratings of the photographs by students

resulted in a 100% success rate in recognition of race. It is concluded, then, that the
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findings arc not attributable to some sort of problem with the stimulus materials.
When one considers the results from the analysis of the dichotomous
(guilty/not guilty), continuous (confidence and likelihood questions), and qualitative

data - together with the experimental rigour and power of the present study - the
findings offer compelling support for the conclusion that the juror task (with an

Aboriginal as the defendant and non-Aboriginal Australians as jurors) may not be a
behavioural context that is susceptible to the effects of modem racism. If one
accepts that this is the case, are these findings the result of the particular social
context in which the study was conducted? Or are the situational determinants for
modem racism effects described by McConahay (1986) deficient or incomplete in

some way? This discussion will first examine these two possibilities before giving
consideration to the implications of the findings for Aborigines in Australian courtsof-law. Finally, a tentative conclusion will be drawn regarding the implications of
the present study's findings for the behavioural contexts for modem racism effects.

Modern Racism and the Australian Context
This first explanation for the above findings accepts that the decision-making

task of jurors might, in some social contexts, be susceptible to modern racism effects
-but suggests that there might be some aspect of modem raoism theory which might
vary according to the particular social context. Thus, there might be aspects of
modem racism theory which, in the Australian context, differ to the North American
context. There are two aspects of modem racism theory which might vary according
to the particular social context: the salience of race, and the social desirability for

egalitarianism.
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Salience ofrace.
The nullifying effects of instructions found by Pfeifer and Ogloff (I 991)

might offer some insight into the findings of the present study. Jn the Pfeifer and
Ogioffstudy it was concluded that instructions to the jury might alert the participant

to the fact that racial prejudice might be an issue, and thus cause them to adjust their
judgment accordingly. It could be that, in the present study, participants did not need

to be alerted to the fact that racial prejudice might be an issue. That is, simply being
aware that the defendant was an Aboriginal may have been enough to alert the

participant that racial prejudice might be an issue. This implicates a particular tenet
of modem racism theory: salience of race (McConahay, 1986). Although, as noted

in the introduction, there is every reason to believe tl•at modem racism is a
phenomenon that can be generalised from one national context to another (at least,
within western cultures), it seems reasonable to assume that there might be subtle
differences in the specific nature of the situation in different countries - or even
areas within countries. As noted in the introduction, Aboriginals represent a
significantly smaller proportion of the total population in Australia (about2% of the
total population) than do African Americans in the United States (about 10% of the
total population). Also, as noted by Augoustinos et al. (1994, p. 127), the

"indigenous status of Aborigines ma1.<es them a highly salient social group within
Australian society." Thus, it could well be that an Aboriginal defendant is more
likely to arouse a wariness about racial prejudice in the Australian context than an
African American would in the American context. If this is the case, it could be
concluded that simply presenting an Aboriginal as a defendant achieves the same
result as the instructions in the Pfeifer and Ogloff study. Thus, the instructions to
participants in the present study may have been redundant.
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There is <mother aspect about the findings of' the present study which might
implic.ate the relevance of the salience of race. [n the pilot study, when participants
were instructed to make u decision "without prejudice", participants showed a
greater tendency to judge the defendant as being guilty than when no such
instruction was included. As race of the defendant was not mentioned in the pilot
study, race was obviously not salient. One way of interpreting this pattern of results
is to conclude that when race of the defendant was very low in salience (i.e., merely
hinted at by the word "prejudice") participants were able to be biased against an

Aborigine because there was no threat to the non-prejudiced self image of
participants. However, the present study was not designed to test such possibilities
and, thus, any interpretation of this unexpected finding in the pilot study is

speculative. For example, there is no way of knowing if, indeed, participants in the
pilot study did believe that the defendant was Aboriginal. Further research designed
specifically to look at this issue might offer some insight into this point.

Social desirability for egalitarianism.
Another aspect of modern racism theory which might have relevance to the
findings of the present study is the social desirability for an egalitarian ideal.
McConahay (1986) did not raise the issue of variability in the level of social
desirability for egalitarianism in different social contexts. However, it is highly

unlikely that social desirability is a constant across social contexts. Zuwerink,
Devine, Monteith, and Cook (1996), for example, not only found higher levels of
prejudice in a sample of students in the southern states ofthe United States than they
had found in students from northern states, but also found that the southern students
perceived a fairly high degree of prejudice in society's standards. Thus, these
students- in their social context- would not have perceived a particularly high level
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of social pressure to confOm1 to an egalitarian ideal. Katz and Hass (1988) also
found a different pattem of results for southern subjects, and suggested that there
may be stronger, traditional, local nonns of inequality. Katz and Hass (p. 902)

concluded that "the notion of a value-attitude duality may prove to be less
descriptive of people in some regions, localities, and socioeconomic groups than in
others." Thus, it is possible that there might be a higher level of social desirability
for egalitarianism in Australia than in the United States. Only further research can
settle this issue.

Modem Racism TheOIJI.' Possible Limitations
Another interpretation of the present findings is that the decision-making

task of jurors is not a behavioural context for the expression of modem racism
(regardless of social context), and that the theory, as defined by McConahay (1986),

needs to be amended. This discussion examines two possible explanations with this
interpretation- one which takes Duckitt's (1992, p. 297) perspective (with a caveat

added), that discrimination tends not to occur in situations which involve "structured
tasks with relatively clear-cut goals and procedures" and have an expectation of
"equity, objectivity, and fairness," and a second explanation which looks at the
findings from an intergroup discrimination perspective (Tajfel, 1970).

Structured tasks.
Duckitt (1992, p. 297), from a review of a range (which included none of the
JUry simulation studies) of studies looking at discrimination, concluded that

discrimination tends to occur in situations which involve infonnal social interaction
(situations, e.g., like those in the helping behaviour studies of Gaertner & Dovidio,
1986)- and tends not to occur in situations which involve "structured tasks with
relatively clear-cut goals and procedures" and have an expectation of "equity,
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objectivity, and fairness." As noted in the introduction, this appears to he a fairly
accurate description of the decision-making task of jurors. However, this conclusion
of Duck itt docs not account for the number of studies which have found evidence of
racial discrimination using the jury simulation research paradigm (Mazzella &
Feingold, 1994), It is suggested here that Duckitt's description of the situations in
which one should expect discrimination to occur might be an accurate one, except

for when the situation includes elements which are likely to elicit high levels of
emotion. Thus, McConahay may have been incorrect in assuming that the decisionmaking task of jurors per se is susceptible to the effects of modern racism. It might
be that it is only in special, emotion eliciting cases that the decision-making task of
jurors is susceptible to the effects of modem racism, cases, for example, such as
rape. This perspective takes the view that the difference in the findings between this
study and the Pfeifer and Ogloff (1991) study is not due to social differences in
salience of race or in social desirability of egalitarianism, but is due to the differing
natures of the crimes. Thus, it is suggested that in structured tasks with implicit
social expectations of equity and objectivity and which include little, or 110, emotion
eliciting elements, individuals are able to put aside racial prejudices and act

according to the criteria that is either set, or implied, by the task. The results of the
Pfeifer and Ogloff study suggest that, when emotion eliciting elements are present, it
might be necessary to explicitly remind individuals that they are expected to act
without prejudice.
McConahay's (1983) job applicant selection study appears to offer evidence
against the above proposition, The task of selecting job applicants also appears to be
a structured task which involves relatively clear-cut goals and procedures and would
appear to be a task which has an expectation of equity and objectivity- and is a task
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which includes no notable emotion eliciting clements. Nevertheless, McConahay

found that participants were biased against blacks, in that they were more likely to
select a white job candidate than a similarly qualified black candidate. (Presumably,
it is the findings of this study which led McConahay, !986, to suggest the decision-

making task of jurors as one that might be susceptible to modern racism effects.)
Duckitt (1992), however, offered an interesting perspective on the findings of racial
discrimination in McConahay's hiring decision study. Duckitt noted that the

instructions given to participants in McConahay's study may have de-emphasised
the formal objective of the task required of the participants. The instructions to the
participants stressed that the purpose of the study was to assess the subjective

impression which the physical appearance (typeface, colour of the paper, etc) of the
resume made upon the reader (McConahay). Duckitt noted that these instructions
may have, in a sense, given the participants a Jicense to allow themselves to be

unduly influenced by subjective impressions (as opposed to the objective criteria
contained in the job applications). Thus, it is likely that there was a distinct
difference between the mind-set of the participants in McConahay's study and the

mind-set of the participants in the present study, for example, who were infonned
that the purpose of the study was to "test the capacity of mock jurors to make a

judicial decision based upon a summarised version of a trial transcript". It is likely
that the participants in the present study were motivated to arrive at some sort of
objective truth, rather than to provide the experimenter with an example of how

subjective impressions influence objective decisions. Thus, it may be that in
situations in which individuals are clearly expected to be equitable and objective (as in the decision-making task of jurors), and there are no emotional eliciting
elements to distract him/her (as in a crime of burglary with no physical

Modern Racism 59

confrontation or assault), he/she is able to focus on the

non~raciul

information

provided and make a decision that is either largely - or completely - unaffected by
any generic prejudices that he/she may hold.
An intergroup discrimination perspective

One of the fundamental findings in studies of intergroup bias is that simply
being categorised is enough to create intergroup bias ( Tajfcl, 1970). It seems

reasonable to assume that, for most people, men who have their photographs in
police "mugshots" and are suspected of criminal activity belong to some sort of
outgroup. That is, they are not "one of us". Thus, it might be that non-Aboriginal

Australians do not discriminate between Aboriginals who are suspected of
committing a crime and Caucasians who are suspected of committing a crime. From
a perspective of intergroup discrimination, these men may constitute one, relatively
homogeneous, outgroup. Thus, whether or not race is perceived as a relative criteria
for categorisation might depend upon the context of the particular situation. In

effect, those members of the population who would tend to discriminate against
Aborigines are also those who tend to judge a defendant to be guilty when the
evidence is balanced. It should be noted that this interpretation of the findings is
purely speculative. Nevertheless, if further research finds that there are non-racial

categorisation processes which can subsume racial categorisation processes, modem
racism theory would need to allow for the types of behavioural contexts in which
this might occur.

Implications for Aborigines in Australian Courts-ofLaw
If one accepts that the present study's failure to find any significant
differences between the way participants respond to Aboriginal defendants and the
way they respond to Caucasian defendants is an indication that there are no
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diiTcrcnccs in the population, it might seem reasonable to assume that Aborigines
can expect to be treated in Australian

courts~of~law

in such a way that race is not an

issue. However, before such a reassuring conclusion can be drawn, there arc two
points which need to be considered: (a) the limitations regarding the generalisation
of findings from simulated juror studies to the real life context, and (b) the decisionmaking task of jurors is only one aspect of the legal process.
Genera/ising from simulated juror studies.

Simulated juror studies have been criticised for being simplistic and lacking
ecological validity (Mazzella & Feingold, 1994). More specifically, it has been
suggested that the experimental manipulations (race, e.g.) are unduly potent because
of the brevity of trial summaries (Mazzella & Feingold); that juror studies are
simplistic because they do not include jury deliberations (Shaw & Skolnick, 1995);

and that simulation studies are unrealistic because the decisions made by jurors have
no real effect (i.e., no-one is incarcerated as a result of a participant's judicial
decision)(Wilson & Donnerstein, 1977). For example, Shaw and Skolnick found that

group discussion (analogous to jury deliberation) effectively eliminated a reverse
racism bias (i.e., harsher judgments shown toward a white defendant compared to a
black defendant) shown by individual jurors, and Wilson and Donnerstein found that
more guilty verdicts resulted when participants believed that their judgments would
actually determine what happened to the defendant. Although these limitations are
acknowledged, it is, nevertheless, accepted that simulation studies are useful for the
theoretical understanding of processes (Mazzella & Feingold), and that this can,
with appropriate insightful inferences, lead to a better understanding of the real life

situation.
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One further comment needs to be made in light of the present discussion. If it
is the case that individuals arc less able to ignore generic prejudices when emotional
eliciting stimuli arc present and jurors sitting on a real case arc in a more highly
aroused state than mock jurors (who arc engaged in a relatively detached, analytical
paper and pencil task) it might be that real jurors are more susceptible to generic
prejudices than mock jurors. Of course, it is also possible that the presence of a
judge and the deliberation process might counteract such effects. Whatever the case,

caution needs to be taken when genera1ising from the simulated situation.
Aborigines and the legal system.

There are a number of decisions made by various people in the criminal legal
process before a jury decides if a defendant is guilty. For example, police make a

decision to make an arrest; a prosecutors make a decision to prosecute. Thus, it is
not only the decision-making task of jurors which needs to be considered if one
wishes to adequately assess the effect of a defendant's race on the final outcome of

the legal process. In addition to these considerations, there are a number of issues
relating to the way Aborigines interact w;th the European-style legal system in
Australia which have specific relevance for Aborigines. For example, the nature of

traditional aboriginal approaches to social control tend to result in direct conflict
with European-style criminal law and its administration (Thorpe, 1987). With more

specific reference to court room proceedings, Thorpe noted:
Many Aboriginal defendants and witnesses are unable to give their
evidence in the expected way in court as they do not appreciate the
court processes and the importance of the evidence they give in the
outcome of the proceedings. They will often respond only by

answering yes or no to leading questions. They may give the answers
expected of them rather than describe what happened. Their
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descriptions of events will oflen not be precise as to time or place
when being explained in the abstract circumstances of the courtroom.
It is therefore not just the way Caucasians respond to Aborigines that can unfairly

impact upon the way Aborigines are treated in the legal system, but also the way
Aborigines respond to the European-style court process. Thus, the present study
does not assume to offer a complete analysis of how the racial status of Aborigines
impacts upon the nature of their relationship with the legal system, but rather offers

some insight into one aspect of a large and complicated process.

Conclusion: Implications For Modern Racism Theory
As has been emphasised throughout this paper, the focus of this study has

been upon identifying the behavioural contexts for the expression of modem racism.
The theory of modem racism was used to predict that, unless alerted to the fact that

prejudice might be an issue, participants would discriminate against Aborigines. In
response to the lack of significant findings in the present study, this discussion has
raised a number of points which may have implications for the application of the
theory of modem racism - if the theory is to be useful as a means of predicting the

behavioural contexts that one would expect racial discrimination to occur. Firstly, it
was suggested that the salience of a racial minority and the degree to which it is
socially desirable to be non-prejudiced might vary according to the particular social
context. Thus, in order to make accurate predictions about the likelihood of

discrimination occurring in a particular social context, it might be necessary to
assess the salience of the racial minority in that social context - and the degree to
which it is socially desirable to be non-prejudiced in that social context. Secondly, it
was suggested that structured tasks with expectations of equity and objectivity might
be less susceptible to racial discrimination- depending upon the degree to which the

behavioural context is likely to elicit emotion. Thus, in order to make accurate
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predictions about the likelihood of discrimination occurrmg m a particular
behavioural context, it might be necessary to assess (a), the salience of the racial
minority in the particular social context, (b) the social expectation of non-prejudiced
behaviour in the particular task, and (c) the degree of emotion eliciting clements in
the behavioural context.
A third issue raised in this discussion is the possibility that, in some contexts,
non-racial categorisation processes might subsume racial categorisation processes. If
this is the case, modem racism theory would need to allow for the types of

behavioural contexts in which this might occur.
It needs to be emphasised that the above suggestions are the result of

speculation about the findings of no significant differences in the present study.
Further research needs to be conducted to replicate the present study's findings and
to explore some of the issues raised in this discussion before finn conclusions can be
drawn. One issue not addressed in the current study is individual variation in modern
racism. Further research using a modern racism scale as an independent variable in
an experimental study which has a measurable behavioural task as the dependant
variable would be useful for extending the understanding of the scope and context of
racial discrimination in Australia.
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Appendix A

Sampling Procedure
A multistage cluster sampling technique (de Vaus, 1995), incorporating two
stages, was used to randomly select participants for the study. A sample area of the

Perth Metropolitan region was created by drawing boundaries on a map of the city
of Perth so that, as much as possible, non-urban areas (such as rural and semi-rural
districts, national parks, and industrial areas) were excluded from the sample area.
Bums Beach Road and Gnangara Road represented the northern boundary of the
sampling area; sections of the Great Northern Highway, Roc Highway, Tonkin
Highway and Albany Highway represented the eastern boundary; the suburbs of
Kwinana and Armadale represented the southern boundary; and the Indian Ocean
represented the western boundary of the sampling area. The 56 reference maps from
the Streetsmart Perth Street Directory (1997) corresponding to the sampling area

defined above were used to represent the regions in the first stage of the cluster
sampling process. SPSS (version 7) was used to randomly select six reference maps
from the total 56 maps (each stage was designed such that the sampling area was
reduced by approximately I 0% as recommended by de Vaus, 1995). Each reference
map (in the Streetsmart Perth Street Directory, 1997) is divided into 50 grids. For
each of the six map, SPSS was used to randomly select 5 grids from the 50. Thus,
the multistage cluster sampling technique produced 30 sampling areas (grids)
covering 22 suburbs of Perth.
In order to ensure that each of the stimuli (i.e., each "defendant") was
sufficiently represented in each of the conditions, it was decided to base the
sampling numbers in each area on the expectation of a conservative 70%

(approximately) completion rate (the pilot study returned a completion rate of 86%).

I
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Accordingly, each area was sampled until 17 respondents had been recruited. The
sampling procedure for each of the 30 sampling areas was identical: the researcher

began in the north western (top lcfl) corner of the respective sampling area and
continued in a south eastern direction until 17 participants had been recruited.

References
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de Vaus, D. A. (1995). Surveys in social research. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
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Appendix 8
Sex

vauo

Missing

Frequency

Percent

_valid
Percent

Male

1bb

45."

46.3

Female

160
335

53.3
99.1

53.7
100.0

3

.9

3
336

.9
100.0

Total
System
Missing
Total

Total

Cumulative
Percent
46,3

100.0

Age
Valid

Frequency
vaua

Percent

Percent

Cumulative
Percent

10-£'

40

14.£

14.£

14.£

25-30
31-34
35-40
40+
Total

42
51
53
144
336
336

12.4
15.1
15.7
42.6
100.0
100.0

12.4
15.1
15.7
42.6
100.0

26.6
41.7
57.4
100.0

Total

Education

vaua

no_
hi
tert_
tort
grad
tafe
Total

Missing

Total

System
Missing
Total

Valid

Cumulative

Frequency

Percent

Percent

Percent

61

18.U

18.3

18.3

'131
40
41
26
34
333

36.6
11.6
12.1
7.7
10.1
96.5

39.3
12.0
12.3
7.6
10.2
100.0

57.7
69.7
62.0
69.6
100.0

5

1.5

5
336

1.5
100.0
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Politics

Frequencv
vana

aoor
liberal
1 nation

69

20.4

69
338

2D.4
100.0

""69

greens
national
independent
decline
democrats

Missing

19
14
1
9
1
13
35
8
1
269

Percent
29.3
20.4
5.6
4.1
.3
2.7
.3
3.8
10.4
2.4
.3
79.6

unsure
none
all bastards
Total
System
Missing
Total

Total

_Vald
Percent

,·Cumulative
Percent

""·"
25.7

""'"

62.5
69.5
74.7
75.1
78.4
78.8
83.6
96.7
99.6
100.0

7.1
5.2
.4
3,3
.4
4.8
13.0
3.0
.4
100.0

Culture

• vaud

Aust

Asian

Brit
Euro
Amer
Other
Total
Total

Frequency
2<4
10
66
17
3
18
338
338

Cumulative
Percent

Percent

VaiJd
Percent

6ti.3

6ti.:i

3.0
19.5
5.0
.9
5.3
100.0
100.0

3.0
19.5
5.0
.9
5.3
100.0

69.2
88.8
93.8
94.7
100.0

Valid
Percent
J.U
4.4
4.4
5.0
2.7
6.2
4.1
.9
1.2
1.5
.3
66.3
100.0

Cumulative
Percent
J.U
7.4
11.8
16.9
19.5
25.7
29.9
30.8
32.0
33.4
33.7
100.0

""·"

Years In Australia

Frequency
1 vaud

Total

<o yrs
5-9 yrs
10-14 yrs
15-19 yrs
20-24 yrs
25-29 yrs
30-34 yrs
35-39 yrs
40-44 yrs
45-49 yrs
51
100
Total

~~
15
17
9
21
14
3
4

5
1
224
338
338

Percent
J.U
4.4
4.4
5.0
2.7
6.2
4.1
.9
1.2
1.5
.3
66.3
100.0
100.0

Page 2

C2

The Study

The purpose of this research is to examine the decision-making process of mock jurors
Ourors engaged in a simulated trial task). More specifically, the aim is to test the capacity of
mock jurors to make a judicial decision based upon a summarised version of a trial
transcript (such as those found in law reports). A comparison will be made between the
judgements made by real jurors, and the judgements made by mock jurors.
The trial summary you are about to read is a real case. It has been selected randomly from
the Western Australian Law Reports (1992-1996). All the infonnation given in the law
report has been reproduced here. Your task will be to carefully read the summary and
answer questions about the guilt I non-guilt of the defendant.
Please take careful uote of each piece of information as it is presented. You are asked
to read through the summary of the evidence once, and once only, before answering
the questions which follow it.

There are 4 questions. Please answer them in the order presented.

C3
PARTICULARS OF THE CASE

Judge
Judge Marlowe

The Crime
The defendant is accused of breaking and entering the premises of Ms Joan Myerson at 14
Wattle Street West Perth on Wednesday 161h of April at approximately 11.30pm. The home
was ransacked; a Sony VCR (valued at $1,800) and approximately $250 in cash was stolen.

Prosecution Counsel
Mr Graham Wilson has been nominated by the Crown to present the case for the
Prosecution.

Defence Counsel
Mr Daniel Sims has been nominated by Legal Aid to present the case for the Defence.

The Defendant
Mr Mark Reynolds, of unit 15/175 Harbome Street, Glendalough.

Police Photo File AC3785632
The defendant (Mr Reynolds) has pleaded "Not guilty".

.·
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SliM MAllY OF F.VIIJI:NCE I'IIESF.NTI:Il AT TlliAL
Cnsc for the Prosecution.
Summary of the Testimony of Mrs Anita .Jones (Neighbour of the Victim)
Mrs Anita Jones of II Wattle Street West Perth carne out of her front door at II :30 p.m. on
Wednesday 16 111 April because she heard an alarm ringing. She :;aw a blue Commodore w1th
ll broken \ell tail-light pull hurriedly away from number 14 Wattle Street. There were two
people in the car. Mrs Jones immediately phoned the police and reported the incident.
Summary of the Testimony of Ms Myerson (Victim)
Ms Myerson arrived home shortly after 12:00 am on Thursday Ii11 April to find Sergeant
James Fowler questioning Mrs Anita Jones out the front of her house. Accompanied by the
officer, Ms Myerson entered the house. She discovered that the house had been ransacked
and that an expensive Sony video cassette recorder and a sum of cash (approximately $250)
had been stolen. When shown the VCR found in the possession of the defendant, Ms
Myerson is certain that it was the one stolen from her home. When questioned by the
defence, Ms Myerson acknowledges that she has no record of the serial number of the stolen
VCR.

Summary of the Testimony of Sergeant James Fowler
On Thursday I th April at 8:00p.m., Sergeant Fowler observed a blue Commodore with a
broken left tail-light travelling down Scarborough Beach Rd in an easterly direction. After
stopping the driver to question him about the broken tail-light, the officer noticed a video
cassette recorder sitting on the back seat of the car. The officer realised that the vehicle
fitted the description of one seen at the scene of a break and enter the previous night, at
which an expensive video recorder had been stolen. The officer first asked if the driver was
aware that his tail-light was broken. The driver replied that he was not. Having identified the
driver as Mr Mark Reynolds [the defendant], the officer then asked where Mr Reynolds
had been at 11:30 p.m. the previous night. Mr Reynolds replied that he was at home at
11.30 the previous night. Sergeant Fowler asked Mr Reynolds if he had been at home all
night. Mr Reynolds replied that he had been at the Hotel until10.30. When asked if anyone
could verifY this, Mr Reynolds replied: "My mate, Ian Walters was with me when I left the
pub." The officer then asked if it was Mr Reynolds's VCR in the rear of the car. Mr
Reynolds replied that it was. The officer enquired when and where the VCR had been
purchased. Mr Reynolds replied "about 12 months ago from a shop in Perth". The officer
asked ifMr Reynolds had a receipt for the VCR. "I don't think so" replied Mr Reynolds.
When asked where he was taking the VCR now, Mr Reynolds replied that he had just
picked it up from his friend's house who had been looking after it while he was visiting
relatives up North".
Summary of the Testimony ofMs Tracy Freeman
(Staff-Member at the Nookcnburra Hotel)
Ms Tracy Freeman, bar attendant at the Nookenburra Hotel, saw both the defendant [Mr.
Reynolds] and his Iii end Ian [Mr Walters] leave the pub together at !0:30pm on Wednesday
I&" April. She is sure of this because they were the only people in the lounge at the time and
she had looked at the clock to see how long she had left of her shift. She knows Ian [Mr
Walters] because he drinks at the pub regularly. Ms Freeman left the pub at 11.30 p.m .. She
could not recall seeing a blue Commodore in the car park when she left that night.

cs
Summary of the Testimony of Mr Murphy (Ncigl1bour of the Ocfcndant)

Mr Ronald Murphy of unit 5/175 1-i<~rhornc St, Glcndalough left his flat at II .20pm on
Wednesday 161h April to go to his work as a night-shift garage attendant. His parking bay in
the block of flats is next to that of Mr Reynolds. He cannot recall seeing Mr Reynolds's

car parked in its bay at that time. When Mr Murphy returned home from work at

~:30

am on

1
'

Thursday I 1' April, Mr Reynolds's car was parked in its bay. Mr Murphy docs not pass
Mr Reynolds's flat to get to the parking hays.

Case for the Defence.
Summary of the Testimony of Mr Ian Walters (Friend of tllC Defendant)
Mr Ian Walters of27 Tasman Street, Glendalough, has been a friend ofMr Reynolds' for

many years. Mr Reynolds had left his Sony VCR with him [Mr Walters] about 2 months
previously when Mr Reynolds had gone up North to visit relatives. Mr Walters received a
telephone call from Mr Reynolds on Wednesday I61h April around 5 p.m .. Mr Reynolds
told him that he had just returned from up North and would like to pick up his VCR. It was
arranged that Mr Reynolds would pick it up the following day around 7 p.m. [Thursday 1tlt
April]. After talking further, they decided to meet at the "Nooky'' [Nookenburra Hotel] that
evening for a drink. They left the pub about 10:30 p.m .. Mr Walters was dropped off at
home (27 Tasman Street, Glendalough) by Mr Reynolds at "about a quarter to eleven."
When questioned by the prosecution, Mr Walters acknowledges that there is nobody who
can verify where he [Mr Walters] was at 11.30 p.m. on the evening of Wednesday I6tl1 of
April.

Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Testimony of the Defendant (Mr. Reynolds).
Where were you on the night of Wednesday 16th of April at 11.30 p.m.?
I was at home.
Where were you earlier in the evening?
I was at the Nookenburra Hotel with my mate Ian Walters.
What time did you leave the hotel?
About 10.30. It took me about fifteen, twenty minutes, to drop Ian off, so I was home
before 11 O'clock.
Do you recognise this VCR, Mr Reynolds? [Indicating the VCR found by police in Mr
Reynolds's car.]
Yes, it's mine. I bought it about 12 months ago.
What was it doing in your car when the police pulled you over?
I had just picked it up from Jan's place -I'd lent it to him while I was visiting relatives
up North.

Q: Thank you, Mr Reynolds.
Cross-examination by Prosecution

Q: How far is it from the Nookenburra Hn+ .:I to your place of residence, Mr Reynolds?
A: About three or four kilometres.
Q: And you drove straight home from the hotel on the night of the 16th of April?
A: Yes- well, like I said, I dropped Ian off on the way.

Q: You say it took you only 15 minutes?
A: Yeah- fifteen or twenty minutes.
Q: You didn't take any detours- or stop off anywhere else along the way?
A: No.

Q: Do you live alone, Mr Reynolds?
A: No- I'm staying with my aunt.
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Q:
A:
Q;
A:
Q:
A:
Q;
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
B;
A:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:
Q:

So your aunt can verify that you were home between eleven o'clock and eleven thirty?
Well- she was asleep when I got home.
So nobody can verilY where you were at eleven thirty on the night in question'!
No, not really.
An eyewitness described a car with a broken taillight- just like yours, Mr Reynoldsat the scene of a burglary at 11.30 p.m. that night.
It's a common car.
How do you account for the fact that your neighbour, Mr Ronald Murphy, did not see
your car parked in its bay when he left for work at 11.20 p.m.?
He made a mistake.
You say this VCR is yours'! [Indicating VCR found by police in Mr Reynolds's car.J
Yes
But the police claim this is the stolen VCR!
I can see how they could make that mistake- it's a common model.
Ms Myerson has positively identified this video recorder as the one stolen from her
home on the night of the l6 1h of April. How do you account for that?
She's made a mistake.
Where did you get your VCR from?
I bought it a year ago in a shop in Murray street.
Are you sure about that?
Yes.
You couldn't have made a mistake?
No.
Everybody seems to be making mistakes except for you, Mr Reynolds. What was the
shop called?
I don't remember.
How did you pay for it?
I paid cash for it.
What happened to the receipt?
I don't know, I must have lost it when I was travelling around up North.
Why was the VCR in your car on the evening that the police stopped you?
I'd just picked it up from my friend's house. He had been looking after it for me.
In summary, Mr Reynolds, you have no receipt for this video recorder, you cannot
remember the shop where you bought it ~and yet you still maintain that it belongs to
you?
Yes.
Thank you, Mr Reynolds.

Judge: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, this concludes the evidence in this case. It is now
your responsibility to detenninc ifthe prosecution has successfully discharged their burden
of proof. Ifthere is reasonable doubt in your mind, you must find the defendant not guilty. If
there is no reasonable doubt in your mind, you must find the defendant guilty as charged.

That completes the presentation of the evidence. Turn the page now and proceed with
·the questions related to this case.

C7

Questionnaire

Please respond to the following questions with reference to the trial summary you have just
read. Remember, you must not refer back to any of the evidence.

Question I
Do you judge the defendant to be guilty. or not guilty?
(Please indicate by marking one box only.)
Not Guilty 0

Guilty 0

wny?___________________________________________________

Question 2
Please indicate your level of confidence in your judgement on the following scale:

Not Confident
Confident

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very

Question 3
Please indicate whether you think it's likely that the defendant committed this crime
(regardless of how you might judge them as a juror):
Did not commit
this crime

2

3

4

5

6

7

Did commit
this crime

Please note that a "1" indicates that you are 100% sure that the defendant did 1101 commit
this crime, and a "7" indicates that you are I 00% sure that the defendant did commit this
crime.

Please Turn Over

CR

Question 4
Participant's Background Information (Please mark the appropriate box.)

Female 0

Gender

MalcD

Age

18-24 D

Education

High School (incomplete)
High School (completed)
Tertiary Degree (incomplete)
Tertiary Degree (completed)

25-30 D

31-34 D

D
D
0

35-40 D

40+0

Post Graduate Qualifications
Tafc Diploma
Trade Qualifications

0
0

0

D

Occupation

Political
Orientation

Cultural
Identity

If an election was held this week, I would vote for: (Political party)

0 Australian
0 Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander

D Asian
D British
D European
D American
D Other

Number of years in Australia----·

Please note that the purpose for gathering the information on this page is simply to
ensure that the participants who take part in this study are a reasonable
representation
of the total population of Perth.

Thank you for your participation

Appendix D

Jury Simulation Study

IMPORTANT
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING!

The trial summary you have just read is not real. The fictional case was
created for study purposes only. The defendants depicted in the
photographs are people who volunteered to have their photos taken
purely for the purposes of this study.
They have not been accused of any crime.

The Aim of the Study
The aim of the study is to examine how judges' instructions impact upon simulated
juror decisions when race of the defendant might be an issue. In order to do this,

some participants have been presented with a White Australian (Caucasian) as a
defendant, others have been presented with an Aboriginal person as a defendant. In
addition to this variation in the presentation of the trial, the type of judges'
instructions has also been varied. Participants have been presented with one of four
types of judges' instructions: I) Instructions which tell the participant not to be
prejudiced; 2) Instructions which remind the participant that all defendants are
treated equally under the law; 3) Instructions which tell the participant to focus only
on the evidence; or 4) No instructions at all.
If you are interested in the results ofthis study, please feel free to contact me to
obtain a summary ofthe findings.
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this research project.

Murray Riggs
Honours Student
Department of Psychology
Edith Cowan University
TelephonC: 9307 4730
Email: m.riggs@cowan.edu.au
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Appendix E

Development of the trial summary

An existing experimental trial summary (Miller, 1997) was modified for the
present study. An initial pilot study (with no mention of race, no instructions, and
using psychology students as participants, 21 female, 9 male), 63 % of the

...

participants ( 19 out of 30) judged the defendant to be guilty. Another potential
problem identified by the pilot study stemmed from the fact that, in the original trial
summary, the defendant walked home from the hotel because he had had too much
to drink. In the pilot study, 13 % of the participants (4 out of 30) indicated that they

considered that alcohol was a motivating factor for the crime. This was considered
to represent a potential confound for two reasons: (a) even if white participants
discriminate (in the perceived potential for criminal behaviour) between white
persons and Aboriginal persons, they might not discriminate (in the perceived
potential for criminal behaviour) between white persons under the influence of
alcohol and Aboriginal persons under the influence of alcohol; and (b) the

perception in the general community that Aboriginals, in particular, have
behavioural problems related to the consumption of alcohol (Augoustinos, Ahrens,

& Innes, 1994; Hunter, 1991; Larsen, 1981; Marjoribanks & Jordan 1986). In order

to overcome the problems noted above, the facts of the case were adjusted so that,
(a) the circumstantial evidence against the defendant was slightly reduced, and (b)

there was no mention of the defendant having too much to drink. The refined
version of the case was subsequently presented to 22 participants ( 12 male, I 0
female) randomly selected from five suburbs of Perth. The results showed that the
evidence was balanced in that, when no instructions were included, 50% (II of 22)
of the participants judged the defendant to be guilty.

E2
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Appendix F
Instructions l1ilot
In order to check that the instructions did not affect the guilt determinations

of mock jurors when no race was mentioned, 41 (15 male, 26 female) participants
randomly selected from five suburbs of Perth were randomly allocated to either a
"without prejudice" condition or an "evidence" condition. The results showed that,
in the "evidence" condition, the evidence was balanced in that 50% (I 0 of 20) of the
participants judged the defendant to be guilty.

However, when the participants were instructed to judge the defendant
"without sympathy or prejudice", 75% (15 of 20) of the participants judged the
defendant to be guilty. It was concluded that there were three possibilities for this
finding, (a) participants were responding to the word "prejudice" by being more
likely to judge the defendant guilty than not guilty, (b) participants were responding
to the word "sympathy" by being more likely to judge the defendant guilty than not
guilty, or (c) the finding represented an unreliable result.

In order to investigate these possibilities, a further 21 participants were
recruited to respond to the "without sympathy or prejudice" instructions with the
word "sympathy" removed. It was expected that if the participants were responding
to the word "prejudice" by being more likely to judge the defendant guilty, a similar
result to that found with the "without sympathy or prejudice" instruction would be

obtained, because the presence of the word "prejudice" is a constant across both
conditions. However, if the participants were responding to the word "sympathy" by being more likely to judge the defendant guilty- it was expected that a similar
result to the first three conditions would be found. That is, about 50% of participants
would judge the defendant guilty, because the word "sympathy" would no longer be

1'2
present to produce the effect. Similarly, if the finding in the "without sympathy or
prejudice" condition represented an unreliable rcsull it was expected that about S0%1

of participants would judge the defendant guilty, because it would be unlikely that
an unreliable result would be replicated.
When the word "sympathy" was removed from the "without sympathy or
prejudice" instruction, 76% (16)of the 21 participants judged the defendant to be
guilty. Although, individually, the pilot studies lacked the power to find a significant
difference, the replication of the same finding with two independent groups adds
confidence to the reliability of the findings. It was therefore concluded from this
result that when mock jurors (in Perth) are asked to judge a defendant (charged with
burglary) "without prejudice"- when no race is mentioned - they are more likely to
judge a defendant to be guilty than when no such instruction is included.
This finding was unexpected and it was subsequently necessary to consider
the implications of it for the main study. It was concluded that, when the participants
were instructed to make their decision without prejudice - they assumed that the

defendant was Aboriginal, and were subsequently biased in their responses because,
as race was not mentioned, there was no threat to the non-prejudiced self image of

participants. (It is, of course, possible that participants assumed that tl1e defendant
belonged to some race other than Aboriginal. However this is considered to be
unlikely because, as noted above, when prejudice is raised as a public issue in
Australia, Aborigines are the most salient racial minority, Ray, 1981. In any case, as
noted in the discussion on the generalisability of modem racism theory, it is
expected that racist effects would be similar regardless of the racial minority.) It was
therefore expected that when participants were presented with a Caucasian
defendant in the "without prejudice" condition, this effect would disappear. That is,

F3

when the defendant is Caucasian, participants would no longer surmise that the
defendant is Aboriginal and would therefore be as likely to judge the defendant not
guilty as they will be to judge the defendant guilty.

It was also predicted that this effect would disappear when the defendant is

Aboriginal (in the "without prejudice" condition) - because once race is made
salient (one of the conditions for positive behaviour toward blacks of McConahay,
1986, noted above) the participants would perceive the possibility of being seen as
prejudiced. Thus, although the fmdings with respect to the "without prejudice"

condition in the pilot studies were unexpected, the expectations with respect to the

main study remained the same.
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Appendix G
The Charge
The defendant is charged with burglary.
The Defendant

Police Photo File AC3785632

The defendant has pleaded "Not guilty".
Subjective Impressions Of Defendant
Question 1
Please indicate how attractive you fmd the defendant on the following scale:
Not Attractive 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very Attractive

Question 2
Please indicate how likeable you find the defendant on the following scale:
Not Likeable

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Very Likeable

Question 4
Please indicate your estimation of the age and race of the defendant:
Age: ________________

Race: ___________ _ _ _______
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Qualitative Classification Coding
Guilty

Jud~:ments

1. "Evidence": How many pieces of evidence does the participant indicate that they
have used to support a guilty judgeme-nt? (Pieces of evidence are counted
regardless of accuracy or logic.)
2. "Speculations": How many speculations have they added to strengthen their
argument for making their guilty judgment? (Includes any statement which is
obviously used to justify the participant's guilty judgment- regardless of

whether the statement is logical, legally relevant, or is clear in meaning or
implication.)
3. Does the participant make a general statement indicating that there is too much
evidence I the evidence is too strong?

Examples of pieces of evidence
Linking defendant to the crime

Car identification at scene of crime
Car was leaving in a hurry
Two people in the car
Defendant left pub right time/ enough time to commit crime
Establishing that video belongs to victim
Video found in back seat identified by victim as victim's video
No receipt
No recollection of shop
No warranty
No alibi

Car was not seen in car park at time of crime
No finm alibi established (no confinmation that he was home at time of the burglary)
Examples of speculation
Adding strength to pieces of evidence by speculating about its likelihood of
being true:
Unlikely someone would not keep a receipt
Unlikely someone would not remember the shop
Unlikely someone would take that long to get home
"Unlikely" could be replaced by "hard to believe"

I2

Casting doubts on veracity of the defendant's testimony based upon
unsupported speculation(s) about defendant's behaviour
If he owned the video,
he would've picked it up from his mate's place the night before when he
dropped him off from the pub
he would've left it with his aunt

he would not have left it in his car for 24 hours
Stating, or implying, that the defendant is lying, or is unreliable

The defendant is unsure of his answers
Mates will stick together

Answers sound well rehearsed
Unreasonable explanation
Reference to the appearance of the defendant, e.g., "The defendant looks a bad sort."

Not Guilty Judements

1. "WCak points": How many weak points in the case does th~ participant indicate
that they have used to support a not guilty judgment? (Weak points are counted
regardless of accuracy or logic.)

2. Does the participant make a general statement indicating that the evidence is
inconclusive?
Examples of weak points

Examples of "inconclusive" statements
The evidence is inconclusive
There is reasonable doubt
The evidence is doubtful

Prosecution needs more evidence

J1
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Hi log
* * * * * * * *

H I E R A R C II I C A L

• •

DATA

L 0 G

Information
287 unweighted cases accepted.
0 cases rejected because of out-of-range factor values.
0 cases rejected Lccause of missing data.
287 weighted cases will be used in the analysis.

FACTOR Information
Factor
GUILT

Level

RACE

INS

* * *

• •

2
2
3

Label
Guilt
Race
Instructions

* * * * * HI ERARC HI CAL

L 0 G

L I NE A R

~

* * * *

DESIGN 1 has generating class
GUILT*RACE*INS
Note: For saturated models
.500 has been added to all observed cells.
This value may be changed by using the CRITERIA = DELTA subcorrunand.
The Iterative Proportional Fit algorithm converged at iteration 1.
The maximum difference between observed and fitted marginal totals is
.000

and the con•rergence criterion is

.250

Observed, Expected Frequencies and Residuals.
Factor

Code

OBS count

EXP count

Residual

Guilty
Aborigin
none

28.5

28.5

. 00

Std

Resid
GUILT
RACE

INS
.00

INS

evidence

30.5

30.5

. 00

INS

non_prej

33.5

33.5

.00

28.5

28.5

. 00

.00
.00
RACE

INS

Caucasio
none

.00

INS

evidence

21.5

21.5

.00

INS

non_prej

31.5

31.5

• 0\l

.00
.00
Page 1

J2

Not Guil
Aborigin

GUILT

RACE
INS

none

18.5

18.5

.00

INS

evidence

17.5

17.5

. 00

INS

non _prej

18.5

18.5

.00

17.5

17.5

.00

.00
.00
.00

RACE
INS

Caucasio
none

.00

INS

evidence

25.5

25.5

.00

INS

non_prej

21.5

21.5

. 00

.00
.00

Goodness-of-fit test statlstics
Likelihood ratio chi square =
Pearson chi square =

********

. 00000
. 00000

HIERARCHICAL

••

OF

0

=0

DF

L 0 G

P = 1. 000

P

1.000

LINEAR

* * *

~

•

Tests that K-way and higher order effects are zero.
K

OF

L.R. Chisq

Prob

Pearson Chisq

Prob

Iteration

3
2
1

2

1. 829

.4007

1.823

4.734
16.198

.6924

4.772

.4018
.6878

2

7

.1339

16.178

.1347

0

11

2

Tests that K-way effects are zero.
K

OF

L.R. Chisq

Prob

Pearson Chisq

Prob

Iteration

1
0
"
3

4
5
2

11.4 64
2.905
1. 829

. 0218
. 7146
.4007

11.406
2.949
1.823

.0224
.7079
.4018

c

* * * * * * * * HI ERARCHI CAL
* •

L 0 G

0
0

L I NE A R

* * * * *

Tests of PARTIAL associations.
DF

Partial Chisq

Prob

GUILT*RACE

1

1.591

.2071

GUILT* INS

2

1.309

. 5196

RACE* INS

2

.052

. 97 4 6

GUILT

1

10.606

. 0011

RACE

1

.003

.9530

Effect Name

Iter

2
2
2
2
2
Page2

J3
INS

.855

2

,fi522

2

***••·*

'

I!IE:RARCI-!ICAL

L 0 G

LIUE:AR

'""'"'

'

Backward Elimination (p"' .050) for DESIGN 1 'ttith generating class

GUILT*RACE*INS
Likelihood ratlo chi square

=

OF

. 00000

I:E Deleted Simple Effect is

=

0

1. 000

P

OF

L.R. Chisq Chang8

Prob

2

1. 829

. 4007

Iter
GUILT*RACE*INS

2

Step 1

The best model has generating class
GUILT*RACE
GUILT* INS
RACE*INS
Likelihood ratio chi square =

1.82905

If Deleted Simple Effect is
Iter

OF

2

p =

•

401

OF

L.R. Chisq Change

Frob

GUILT* RACE

1

1. 591

.2071

GUILT* INS

2

1.309

.5196

RACE*INS

2

.052

. 97 4 6

2
2
2

Step 2

The best model has generating class
GUILT*RACE
GUILT* INS
Likelihood ratio chi square

If Deleted Simple Effect is

DF=4

1. 88060

P=

.758

OF

L.R. Chisq Change

Prob

1

1.568

.2105

Iter
GUILT* RACE
2

Page 3

J4
GUILT* INS

1.28(;

2

• 'j'). ~J/

2

H I E R ARC H I CA L
~tep

L 0 G

LINE/\.H

"''"'

3

The best model has generating class
GUIL'l'*RACE
INS
Likelihood ratio chi square ""

OF

Ll6647

6

p =

. 788

OF

L.R. Chisq Change

Prob

GUILT*RACE

1

l. 568

.2105

INS

2

.855

.6522

If Deleted Simple Effect is
Iter
2
2

Step 4
The best model has generating class
GUILT* RACE
Likelihood ratio chi square

OF

4.02126

If Deleted Simple Effect is
Iter
GUILT* RACE

8

p

=o

•

855

OF

L.R. Chisq Change

Prob

1

1. 568

.2105

2

Step 5
The best model has generating class
GUILT
RACE
Likelihood ratio chi square

5.58898

If Deleted Simple Effect is
Iter

OF

~

9

P

=

,

780

OF

L,R. Chisq Change

Prob

GUILT

1

10.606

.0011

RACE

1

.003

.9529

2
2

* * * * * * * * HI ERARC HI CAL

••

L 0 G

L I NE AR

* * * *

*

Page4

J5

Step 6

The best model has generating class
GUILT
Likelihood ratio chi square

5.59247

I f Deleted Simple Effect is

OF "' 10

P

.848

OF

L.R. Chisq Change

ProO

1

10. 60'i

. 0011

Iter

GUILT
0

Step 7
The best model has generating class
GUILT
Likelihood ratio chi square

OF

5.59247

********HIERARCHICAL

••

L 0 G

10

p "'

• 848

LINEAR

****T

The final model has generating class
GUILT
The Iterative Proportional Fit algorithm converged at iteration 0.
The maximum difference between observed and fitted marginal totals is
.000
and the convergence criterion is
.250

Observed, Expected Frequencies and Residuals.
Factor

Code

OBS

count

EXP count

Residual

28.0

28.5

-.50

Std

Resid

GUILT
RACE

INS

Guilty
Aborigin
none

-.09

INS

evidence

30.0

28.5

1. 50

INS

non_prej

33.0

28.5

4.50

28.0

28.5

-.50

.28
.84
RACE

INS

Caucasio
none

-.09

INS

evidence

21.0

28.5

-7.50

INS

non_prej

31.0

28.5

2.50

1. 40

.47
Page 5

J6
GUILT

Not GuiJ.

Aborigin
none

RACE

INS

18.0

19.3

-1.33

-.30

INS

evidence

17.0

19.3

-2.33

INS

non _prej

18.0

19.3

-1.33

17.0

19. 3

-2.33

-.53
-.30

Caucasio
none

RACE

INS
-.53

INS

evidence

25.0

19. 3

5. &7

INS

non_prej

21.0

19.3

1 . () 7

1.29

.38

Goodness-of-fit test statistics
Likelihood ratio chi square
Pearson chi square

~

5.59247
5. 55172

DF

10

OF= 10

P ""

• 84 8

P

.851

NParTests
Chi-Square Test
Frequencies
Race X Instruction

ao none
ab evld
ab
nonprej
wnone
wevid

w

nonprej
control
Total

Observed
N

Expected
N

~~

<o.r

1.0

27.2

2.8

33

29.6

3.4

28
21

26.1
26.7

1.9
-5.7

31

30.2

.8

25
196

29.6

-4.6

Residual

Page 6

J7
Test Statistics
Rae~.~-

Instruction
vnl·.,quare
df
Asymp, Sig.

"·""6

.831
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is
26.1.

ANOVA

Guilt= Guilty
Case Processing Summa,Y•b
Included
N
Percent

Cases
Excluded

N

Total

Percent

•

•

N

p~

a. GUilt - Gu1lty
b. Confidence by Race, Instructions

Sum of
Squares
~..oonnuence

IVI81n 1::118C S

2-Way Interactions

~vomo1neuJ

Race
Instructions
Race •
Instructions

Model
Residual
Total

Uni ue Metho
Mean
Square
df
.040

F

':;~~

~

.884

2

.762
.442

.561

5.094

2

2.547

3.231

6.575
130.056
136.632

5
165
170

1.315
.788
.804

1.668

~~;

~mque

Sig.
vonuuence

Mam t:uec s

2-Way Interactions
Model
Residual
Total
a. All effects entered simultaneously

~vomoJneo)

.oo•

Race
Instructions
Race*
Instructions

.327
.572
.042
.145

Guilt= Not Guilty

Page 7

JB
Case Processing Summaryl•b

ases
Included
N
Percent

Excluded
Percent
N

N

Total
Percent

•

•

•

a. Guilt= Not Guilty
b. Confidence by Race, Instructions

ANOVA11

2~Way

Interactions

Race
Instructions
Race*
Instructions

Model
Residual
I

1.165
.934

1
2

1.165
.467

.475
.190

.799

2

.400

.163

2.727
269.850

5
110

.545
2.453

.222

ANOVA11

mque

""

Sig.

1 vonnaence

1Vl81n t:U8ClS

l_""m"'"""'

Race
Instructions
2-Way Interactions

Race*

Instructions
Model
Residual
Total
a. All effects entered Simultaneously

.oo•
.492
.827
.850
.952

ANOVA

Guilt= Guilty
Case Processing Summa,Y•b

b. likely by Race, Instructions

Page 8
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ANOVA11

Race

Instructions
2~Way

Interactions

.161
1.785

1
2

.161
.892

.214
1.191

.745

2

.372

.497

2.353
123.647

5
165

.471
.749

.628

Race •

Instructions
Model
Residual
I

ANOVA3
I,Jnlque
Sig.
'"elY

'""'" errec1s

2-Way Interactions

~ocomomeo)

.411

Race
Instructions

.644
.307

Race*

.609

Instructions
Model
Residual
Total
a. All effects entered Simultaneously

.679

Guilt= Not Guilty
Case Processing Summaryot•b

Cases
Excluded
N
Percent

N

.

a. Guilt= Not Guilty
b. likely by Race, Instructions

.

N

ANOVA'
Sum of

Squares

'""'Y

Main trreC\5

2-Way Interactions
Model

Residual
Total

~omo1neo)

o.ou4

Race
Instructions
Race*
Instructions

.518
5.760

Unique Method
Mean
Square
df

~

l.lUl

F

'·"""
.271

2

.518
2.880

1.504

3.277

2

1.638

.856

10.438
210.596
221.034

5
110
115

2.088
1.915
1.922

1.090
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ANOVA1
nrque

Sig.
lll\8y

1VIdl0 t=.\\8C!!i

1_'-0"ruiOeul

·~~~
.227

Race
Instructions

2-Way Interactions

Race*
Instructions

.428

Model
Residual

.370

Total
a. All effects entered stmultaneously

Crosstabs
Case Processing Summary

N

ns rue rons
*Race

Valid
Percent

133

100.0%

Cases
Missinq
N
Percent

Total

.0%

0

Percent

N

133

100.0%

Instructions * Race Crosstabulatlon

Count
Race
Aboriginal Caucasian

1 ms1rucuons

Total

none

Z4

>!U

evidence
non_prej

22

17

26
72

24
61

..

Total

39
50
133

Chi-Square Tests

Asymp.
Sig.
(2-tailed)

Value
df
earson
.176'
2
Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
.176
2
Linear-by-Linear
.066
1
Association
N of Valid Cases
133
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than

.916
.916
.797
5. The minimum expected count is 17.89.

ANOVA
Case Processing SummarY

a. EVIDENCE by Race, Instructions

Page 10
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Unique Method
Mean
df
Square

Sum of
Squares
Maon oneclS

2-Way Interactions

cvomCineu,

1.o4o

,

.54"

.4fZ

Race
Instructions

.172
1.438

1
2

.172
.719

.148
.619

Race •
Instructions

1.602

2

.801

.690

3.015
147.556
150.571

5
127
132

.603
1.162
1.141

.519

Model

Residual
Total

F

ANOVAa,b
~~Jque

Sig.
Main oneclS

2-Way Interactions

~<-omooneoJ

.IUZ

Race
Instructions
Race •
Instructions

.701
.540
.504

Model
Residual
Total
a. EVIDENCE by Race, Instructions
b. All effects entered simultaneously

.762

Crosstabs
Case Processing Summary

N
ns ru:uons
*Race

Valid
Percent

84

100.0%

Cases
Missing
N
Percent

Total
N

.0%

0

Percent

84

100.0%

Instructions* Race Crosstabulatlon

Count
Race
Aboriginal
caucasian

ns rue 1ons

Total

none
evidence
non_prej

Total

;~

'~

~~

16
44

15
40

31
84
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Chi-Square Tests

Asymp.

Value

Slg.
(2-tailod)

df

earson
8
1.160
Chi-Square
Likelihood Rallo
1.169
Linear-by-Linear
.146
Association
N of Valid Cases
84
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count

2

.560

2

.557

1

.702

less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.00.

T-Test
Group Statistics

l-\00r1Qln81

..

;:~~

:~

Caucasian

-~,td.
Deviation

Mean

N

Race

Std. Error

Mean

:~~ 8.31E:~~

Independent Samples Test
Levene s Test for

Eouc3"1itYOt Variances
F

!-test for Equality of Means

Sig.

t

df

Sig.
(2-tailed)

Mean
Difference

oqua~

variances
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

3.903

.052

1.287

82

.202

.18

1.304

79.307

.196

.18

Independent Samples Test

t-test for Equalitv of Means
95% Confidence
lnteiVal of the Mean
Std. Error
Upper
Difference
Lower
\I

~~~:~ces
assumed
Equal
variances
not
assumed

.14

-9.6E-02

.45

.13

-9.2E-02

.44

Crosstabs
Case Processing Summary

ases
Valld
N
n~~~IOOS

*Race

Missing

Percent

69

100.0%

N

Percent

0

.0%

N

Total
Percent

69

100.0%
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Instructions • Race Crosstabulatlon

Count
Race
Aboriginal
Caucasian

1 msrrucuons

none

"'11

evidence
non_prej

""24

"

13
11
35

11
34

Total

Total
22
69

Chi-Square Tests
A~ymp.

Sig.
earson

Chi-Square
Likelihood Ratio
Linear-by-Linear
Association
N of Valid Cases

Value
.196a

df

(2-tailed)

2

.907

.196

2

.907

.023

1

.881

69
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.84.

T-Test
Group Statistics

Race
we:a~

points

Mean

N

,'\Liortgma
Caucasian

~;

Std.
Deviation

Std. Error
Mean

:;~

;~

~:~:

Independent Samples Test

Levene s Test for
EaUalitv of Variance!:i
F
we.~~points

"~"~~

variances
assumed

Sig.

.023

t-test for Eaualitv of Means

)

.879

(2-tailed)

Mean
Difference

Sig.

t

df

-.865

67

.390

-.15

-.866

66.610

.389

-.15

Equal

variances

not

assumed
Independent Samples Test
!~test

for Equality of Means
95% Confidence
Interval of the Mean
Std. Error
Difference
Lower
Upper

we,ar;.
points

~qua.

vanances
assumed
Equal
variances

not

.18

-.51

.20

.18

-.51

.20

assumed
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